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WARRANTLESS GOVERNMENT
DRONE SURVEILLANCE: A
CHALLENGE TO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
JENNIFER O’BRIEN*
ABSTRACT
The Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform
Act of 2012 aims to integrate drones into the United States national
airspace by 2015. While the thought of prevalent private and public daily drone use might seem implausible now, the combination of this new
legislation and the increasing availability of inexpensive, technologically advanced small drones will make it a reality. From detectaphones to
pen registers and most recently, the GPS, the Supreme Court has faced
a plethora of unreasonable search challenges to the warrantless use of
such sense augmentation devices by law enforcement to collect information. Acting as the privacy safeguard of the Constitution, the Fourth
Amendment has been invoked to challenge the warrantless governmental use of this ever-evolving timeline of devices. The gauge of Fourth
Amendment protection has been society’s view of what is or is not a
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, with the voluntary increase in the dissemination of personal, private information society’s
objective view of reasonable expectations of privacy has become blurred.
With the ability to capture high-resolution images and video, sustain
mass surveillance, and long-term data retention, the drone presents
one of the greatest challenges to society’s privacy expectations under
the Fourth Amendment.
As the drone is poised to become the newest in a long line of surveillance tools available to law enforcement, an important inquiry is
whether such use will require a warrant. This Comment will analyze
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and Dan Spezzacatena for their encouragement and support and to the members of The
John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law for their assistance in
editing this Comment.
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United States Supreme Court case law concerning various surveillance
devices challenged under the Fourth Amendment and argue for several
approaches to be taken to ensure the protection of privacy rights without needlessly hindering government use of a potentially important investigative device.
INTRODUCTION
On February 4, 2010 Joseph McStay, his wife, Summer, and their
two sons went missing from their home in Fallbrook, California.1 Police
and family were puzzled over their disappearance because the McStay
family left behind their family dogs, recently purchased food, and untouched bank accounts.2 The family’s SUV was found abandoned close
to the Mexican border, almost eighty miles from their Fallbrook home. 3
On February 26, 2010 Texas EquuSearch4 joined the search for the
missing family and brought special equipment that investigators did
not have at their disposal: a radio-controlled drone.5 The drone was
used to search forty miles of an isolated highway between the McStay’s
home and the location of their abandoned SUV.6 The drone, by providing precise aerial images in a fraction of the time of a ground search,
proved to be a significant aid in the search for the McStay family.7 The
drone relayed digital images of the forty-mile expanse and the
1.
Drones Aid in Search for Missing Family, SAN DIEGO NEWS (Feb. 25. 2010),
http://www.10news.com/news/drones-aid-in-search-for-missing-family.
2.
Kristina Davis, McStay Family Disappearance Remains Mystery, U-T SAN
DIEGO NEWS (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/aug/04/mcstay-familydisappearance-remains-mystery/.
3.
On February 8, the family’s SUV was found abandoned near the Mexican border
in San Ysidro, California. Id.; Drones Aid in Search for Missing Family, supra note 1.
4.
See generally Mission Statement, TEXAS EQUUSEARCH, http://texasequusearch.or
g/mission-statement/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2013); About TES, TEXAS EQUUSEARCH,
http://texasequusearch.org/category/about/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2013) (formed in 2000,
Texas EquuSearch is a non-profit, all-volunteer search and rescue organization based in
Dickinson Texas. Texas EquuSearch assists law enforcement in searching for missing
persons by searching areas on foot, by horse, aircraft, and now even by drone); Report a
Person Missing, TEXAS EQUUSEARCH, http://texasequusearch.org/report-a-person-missing/
(last visited Dec. 17, 2013) (stating that an individual can request help from Texas
EquuSearch but only if a formal missing person complaint has been filed with law enforcement and with consent of the law enforcement agency investigating the missing person case).
5.
Drones Aid in Search for Missing Family, supra note 1.
6.
Emily Friedman, Three Weeks Later, Still No Sign of California’s McStay Family, ABC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/mcstay-family-missingcalfornia-weeks/story?id=9957171.
7.
Drones Aid in Search for Missing Family, supra note 1 (stating that one search
with a drone can “take the place of a hundred ground searches” and the drone could
“search every inch of a 15-mile area in a matter of minutes.”). Additionally, the drone is
able to detect footprints and clothing that might not be visible from human aerial observation in a helicopter or plane. Friedman, supra note 6.
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corresponding GPS data to the search team.8 When the drone operator
observed an object, the search team on the ground would be directed to
that specific GPS location rather than scanning the entire area.9
Four months later and 2,000 miles away, the Nelson County Sheriff in North Dakota attempted to execute a search warrant on the
Brossart family to search their farm for six missing cows.10 Three members of the family armed with rifles subsequently chased the Sheriff off
the property.11 The Sheriff then called in back up – an unarmed Predator B drone.12 The drone observed the Brossart’s 3,000-acre farm for
four hours at an altitude of two miles. Live video and thermal images of
two of the Brossart sons and their mother were relayed to officers
parked on a nearby road.13 From these thermal images officers were
able to observe where the suspects were located on the farm and moved
in to arrest them when the suspects were observed to be unarmed.14

8.
Drones Aid in Search for Missing Family, supra note 1.
9.
Id.
10. Clay Dillow, For the First Time, Predator Drones Participate in Civilian Arrests
on U.S. Soil, POPULAR SCIENCE (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article
/2011-12/first-us-citizens-have-been-arrested-help-predator-drone.
11. Id. The six members of the Brossart family were allegedly a part of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, an antigovernment group that the F.B.I. categorizes as a violent
extremist group. The family also had previous clashes with the local police. Brian Bennett, Predator Drone Spy Planes Used in Civilian Arrests, STARS AND STRIPES (Dec. 11,
2011), http://www.stripes.com/news/us/predator-drone-spy-planes-used-in-civilian-arrests1.163154.
12. The Predator B drone is the most commonly used drone by the American military. The Predator B drone is a large drone, looking similar to a military plane and can
hover at an altitude of 25,000 feet for up to forty hours. The Predator B is equipped with
an infrared and a regular camera that employ license plate recognition capabilities. One
of its tasks in modern warfare has been on “hunter-killer” missions in which the Predator
B is armed and sent to search and destroy specified targets. See generally Predator B
UAS, GENERAL ATOMICS AERONAUTICAL, http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predato
r_b.php (last visited Dec. 17, 2013); Jonathan Skillings, Hunter-killer Drone Hits Afghan
Target, CNET (Oct. 30, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9807416-7.html.
The Predator B drone used to search the Brossart farm belonged to the nearby unit of
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and was returning from a 10-hour patrol of the
Canadian-U.S. border when the Sheriff called for assistance. U.S. Customs and Border
Protection currently operate ten Predator drones on the Canadian and Mexican borders in
the United States and have employed the use of unarmed drones since 2005. Bennett, supra note 11.
13. During the four-hour observation, the suspects remained armed and the officers
decided to withdraw. The Predator B drone was sent out again the next day for about
three hours until officers were able to determine using thermal images from the drone
that the suspects were unarmed and ordered the SWAT team to make the arrests. These
images were viewed from a live feed on a government, password-protected website. Bennett, supra note 11.
14. Brian Bennett, Police Employ Predator Drone Spy Planes on Home Front, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/10/nation/la-na-drone-arrest20111211.
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The arrest of the Brossart family members became the first arrest of
U.S. citizens with the aid of a drone.15
The above two above cases illustrate how drones will be used routinely throughout the United States. The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 directs the FAA to
safely integrate public and private drone use into the national airspace
by 2015.16 The image of drones flying above a city and monitoring the
daily movements of its citizens may seem absurdly futuristic but cities
across the United States have been increasing the amount of law enforcement surveillance.17 The New York Police Department operates a
data system that utilizes video cameras, radiation detectors, and license plate readers throughout New York City. 18 This highly sophisticated system can alert law enforcement to the presence of unattended
packages in buildings and quickly locate a suspect vehicle through access to over 100 license plate readers on city streets, bridges, tunnels
and law enforcement vehicles.19 Additionally, a number of cities have
begun to outfit their patrol forces with body cameras to record audio
and video of police interactions with civilians.20
The increase in government surveillance comes at a time when
gun-related officer deaths have increased while a large portion of law

15. Id.
16. Bill Summary & Status H.R. 658, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR00658:@@@R (last visited Dec. 17, 2013).
17. For example, the City Marshal’s office in Fort Worth Texas controls 469 cameras, the Transportation Department has thirteen traffic cameras, and the Public Works
Department controls twenty cameras throughout the city. Bill Hanna, DFW Authorities
Increasingly Using Surveillance Tech, STAR-TELEGRAM (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.startelegram.com/2012/04/20/3901072/dfw-authorities-increasingly-using.html. Atlanta operates a “video integration center” linking police to 100 cameras across downtown Atlanta.
Jeremiah McWilliams, Atlanta Increases Surveillance of City, ATLANTA JOURNAL
CONSTITUTION (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/atlanta-increasessurveillance-of-city/nQLxT/.
18. The system uses technology developed by Microsoft and is called the “Domain
Awareness System.” The system is available to law enforcement worldwide. Elinor Mills,
Surveillance City? Microsoft, NYPD Team on Crime Fight System, CNET (Aug. 8, 2012),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57489636-83/surveillance-city-microsoft-nypd-team-oncrime-fight-system/.
19. Id.
20. See generally Caroline Lowe, Burnsville Police First to Use Body Cameras, CBS
MINNESOTA (Mar. 2, 2011), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2011/03/02/burnsville-policefirst-to-use-body-cameras/; Denver Police To Pilot Body Cameras, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
26,
2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/26/denver-police-to-pilotbo_n_103
3287.html. A manufacturer of law enforcement body cameras, Vievu, reported that it has
sent their cameras to over 1,100 law enforcement agencies nationwide. Erica Goode, Video, a New Tool for the Police, Poses New Legal Issues, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/police-using-body-mounted-video-cameras.html?p
agewanted=all.
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enforcement budgets have decreased.21 Citywide, integrated video surveillance systems and officer body cameras can potentially provide a
cost-effective increase in the safety of both officers and civilians.22 Governmental drone use builds upon these advantages, but due to their
mobility the number of scenarios where law enforcement will employ
drones is greater than that of other surveillance devices such as integrated video surveillance systems or officer body cameras.23
The two above cases illustrate how the assistance of drones is an
important tool for law enforcement in differing scenarios. In a missing
person case such as the McStay case, the largest amount of area has to
be searched within the smallest amount of time and this is exactly what
the drone provided to the search team. 24 In North Dakota the drone
aided law enforcement officers to end a potentially dangerous standoff
situation without firing a single shot.25 However, there is apprehension
in the use of domestic drones due to several safety26 and privacy

21. The number of fatal shootings of police officers went from forty-nine in 2009 to
fifty-nine in 2010 and at the mid-point of 2011, forty officers had been killed by shootings
as opposed to thirty at the mid-point of 2010. Out of 608 police departments surveyed,
seventy percent reported that there had been budget cuts in training. Kevin Johnson, Fatal Shootings of Police Officers are on the Rise, USA TODAY (July 21, 2011),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-07-20-police-shooting-deaths-gunfire-ambush
es-budget-cuts_n.htm; see also OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON AMERICAN POLICE
AGENCIES (2011), available at http://cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/e1 01113406_Economic
%20Impact%20Publication%20vFIN_19APR12.pdf (information on the nationwide budget
cuts of law enforcement agencies and the relation to the crime rate); Chip Johnson, Officer-involved Shootings a Trend Nationwide, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/johnson/article/Officer-involved-shootings-a-trendnation
wide-3619254.php.
22. City-wide surveillance could let police track a suspect for blocks after a crime
has occurred, warn officers of potentially harmful situations, alert officers to the presence
of unattended packages, and put criminals on notice of being on camera across a city. See
generally Lowe, supra note 20; Denver Police to Pilot Body Cameras, supra note 20; Goode,
supra note 20; Mills, supra note 18.
23. Draganfly’s “Draganflyer X4” helicopter drone advertises several uses for law
enforcement including surveillance, evidence gathering at a crime scene, and investigation of traffic accidents. Government Applications, DRAGANFLY INNOVATIONS, INC.,
http://www.draganfly.com/uav-helicopter/draganflyer-x4/applications/government.php
(last visited Dec. 19, 2013). Similarly, AeroVironment’s “Qube” drone promotes law enforcement uses for searching for missing persons, hostage situations, fire-fighting, and
disaster
response.
Qube:
Public
Safety
Small
UAS,
AEROVIRONMENT,
http://www.avinc.com/uas/small_uas/qube/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2013).
24. One drone search can “take the place of hundred ground searches” and the
drone’s cameras can pick up minute details such as footprints that even ground searchers
might miss. Drones Aid in Search for Missing Family, supra note 1.
25. Bennett, supra note 11.
26. Researchers at the University of Texas were able to hack a drone and give it
false GPS instructions. This presents a potential for in-air collisions with other aircraft or
terrorist attacks. Michael Harper, Hackable Drones Worry Government Agencies, RED
ORBIT (July 20, 2012), http://www.redorbit.com/news/technology/1112660569/hackable-

160

J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW

[Vol. XXX

concerns.27 For example, in the North Dakota case, it was revealed that
there had been “at least two dozen drone surveillance flights since
June” by local law enforcement.28 What has not been disclosed is
whether the drone captured images of the private activities of various
North Dakota residents while en route to the Brossart’s home.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the invasion of an individual’s
privacy by forbidding warrantless searches and seizures of an individual and of their effects.29 The advancement of technology has created
new investigative tools for law enforcement but these advancements
have corresponded with constitutionality challenges under the Fourth
Amendment.30 The Supreme Court has analyzed Fourth Amendment
challenges to governmental aerial surveillance,31 listening devices,32
tracking devices,33 and even a thermal imaging device.34 Generally, the
Supreme Court has ruled that warrantless governmental aerial surveillance is permitted35 while use of a thermal imaging device36 and tracking devices37 to obtain information regarding the activities of an individual’s home requires a warrant. Since drone technology gives law
enforcement officers aerial surveillance equipped with thermal imaging, license plate recognition, and GPS technology, the question

drones-worry-government-agencies/. A forty-four foot Navy drone crashed in Maryland.
Spencer Ackerman, Navy Loses Giant Drone in Maryland Crash, WIRED (June 11, 2012),
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/06/bams-crash/.
27. The ACLU has stated numerous concerns over civilians’ privacy being invaded
by constant drone surveillance such as chilling free speech, discriminatory profiling, and
leaking of data or videos taken by law enforcement. Catherine Crump & Jay Stanley, Protecting Privacy from Aerial Surveillance, ACLU (Dec. 2011), https://www.aclu.org/files/a
ssets/protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf.
28. Bennett, supra note 14.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (wiretapping); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (detectaphone); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961) (spike mike); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (pen register); United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (beeper); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
(GPS).
31. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,
445 (1989).
32. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (listening device);
Goldman, 277 U.S. at 129 (detectaphone); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505 (spike mike).
33. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735 (pen register); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276 (beeper); Jones,
132 S. Ct. at 945 (GPS).
34. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001).
35. Riley, 488 U.S. at 448; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207; Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 277 (1986).
36. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
37. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 705 (1984); United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 945 (2012) (GPS).
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becomes whether the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless governmental drone use.38
This Comment will examine previous Supreme Court cases on various surveillance techniques and how these holdings will impact the
projected widespread use of drone technology in the United States. Part
I will provide an overview of drone capabilities and the current FAA
regulations on drones. Part II will give an overview of the Supreme
Court’s case law regarding various forms of government-employed surveillance as challenged under the Fourth Amendment. Part III will discuss how this case law will affect the proposed widespread use of unmanned aircraft within the United States. Finally, Part IV will discuss
the changes that need to be made in the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment analysis in order to adequately protect privacy interests
without unduly burdening law enforcement.
BACKGROUND
PART I: DRONES AND THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
The term “drone” conjures up many thoughts from an unmanned
lethal military weapon to a futuristic Orwellian spying device. 39 So
what exactly is a drone? The FAA defines an unmanned aircraft as “a
device that is used, or is intended to be used, for flight in the air with
no onboard pilot.”40 Commercially, there are several terms used, including unmanned aerial vehicle (“UAV”), unmanned aircraft system
(“UAS”), and the more commonly used term of “drone.”41 For the purposes of this Comment, the term “drone” will be used to denote unmanned aircraft.
Drones come in a wide array of sizes, weights, and technology.42
Larger drones, such as the Predator B drones, resemble commercial
planes and can stay in the air for over thirty hours.43 Possibly the
smallest drones in development are nano air vehicles (“NAVs”).

38. Harry Geiger, The Drones Are Coming, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.cdt.org/blogs/harley-geiger/2112drones-arecoming.
39. George Orwell wrote the classic book “1984” envisioning a future of a “big brother” government watching one’s every move. See generally George Orwell, THE BIOGRAPHY
CHANNEL, http://www.biography.com/people/george-orwell-9429833?page=1 (last visited
Dec. 18, 2013).
40. Nicholas Sabatini, Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.faa.gov/about/initia
tives/uas/reg/media/frnotice_uas.pdf.
41. Drones Moving From War Zones to the Home Front, NPR TALK OF THE NATION
(Apr. 17, 2012).
42. See generally, Crump & Stanley, supra note 27.
43. Id.
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An example of a NAV is AeroVironment’s “Hummingbird” which as its
name suggests looks like a robotic hummingbird.44 The Hummingbird
has a wingspan of 6.5 inches and weighs less than an AA battery.45 Despite its small size, the Hummingbird still packs a communications system, versatile mobility, and a video camera.46 Smaller drones such as
the Qube and Micro-Air Vehicles (“MAVs”)47 are estimated to be the
most sought after type of drone in both the public and private sector. 48
Compared to larger drones, smaller drones are relatively inexpensive to
purchase and maintain,49 easy to transport,50 and possess comparable
technology.51 Most small drones can be controlled through a
smartphone, tablet, or laptop computer making these drones relatively
easy to operate. 52 The live video from the drone is streamed right to the
user’s smartphone or other electronic device.53
The United States is not the only country to recognize the potential of drones and multiple counties now use the small unmanned

44. For a video of the “Hummingbird” in flight, see Jason Paur, Hummingbird
Drone Does Loop-de-Loop, WIRED (Feb. 8 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/20
11/02/video-hummingbird-drone-can-perform-loops/.
45. W.J. Hennigan, It’s a Bird! It’s a Spy! It’s Both, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/17/business/la-fi-hummingbird-drone-20110217.
46. The Hummingbird can hover, fly backwards, and has been able to maintain
flight for ten minutes. Paur, supra note 44; Hennigan, supra note 45.
47. An example of an MAV is the Honeywell T-Hawk. It has been used for detecting
roadside bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan, only weighs seventeen pounds and can be transported in a backpack. The drawback of the T-Hawk is that it can only be operated for approximately forty-six minutes up to an altitude of 10,000 feet, which is much less than
compared to the larger drones. T-Hawk Micro Air Vehicle, HONEYWELL AEROSPACE (July
5, 2012), http://aerospace.honeywell.com/markets/defense/unmanned-systems/2012/07July/t-hawk; Graham Warwick, Stop and Look, AVIATION WEEK (June 14/21, 2010),
available at http://www51.honeywell.com/aero/common/documents/myaerospacecatalogdocuments/Defense_Brochures-documents/Aviation_Week_Eprint.pdf.
As compared to the Predator B UAS which can operate for over thirty hours, up to
50,000 feet and has a wing span of sixty feet. Predator B UAS, supra note 12.
48. Drones Aid in Search for Missing Family, supra note 1.
49. The Parrot AR. Drone can be purchased on Amazon.com for $299.00. The AR.
Drone links with an iPhone, iPod, and iPad. Additionally, the AR. Drone permits interaction between other AR. Drone users. The AR. Drone is powered by high-density batteries.
Parrot AR Drone 2.0, PARROT, http://ardrone2.parrot.com/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
50. Aerovironment’s Qube can be transported in the trunk of a car. Qube: Public
Safety Small UAS, supra note 23. The Honeywell T-Hawk can be transported in a backpack. T-Hawk Micro Air Vehicle, supra note 47.
51. For example, Draganfly’s “DraganFlyer X4” possesses thermal infrared cameras
and an onboard DVR. This allows the DraganFlyer to locate people, vehicles or other objects in the dark and record the live video. DraganFlyer X4 Features, DRAGANFLY
INNOVATIONS, INC., http://www.draganfly.com/uav-helicopter/draganflyer-x4/features/flircamera.php (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
52. Parrot AR Drone 2.0, supra note 49.
53. Id.
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aircraft in agriculture,54 scientific research,55 and industrial maintenance.56 However, currently the largest use of unmanned aircraft is by
the United States military.57 The United States military has been exponentially utilizing drone technology for various conflicts. 58 Drone use
has not been limited to military operations overseas and since 2005 the
Customs and Border Protection Agency (“CBP”) has used drones for
surveillance along both the Mexican and Canadian borders.59 Unarmed
drones have also joined the fight against Mexican drug cartels.60 The
next transition for drone technology will be public use by law enforcement.61 Drones are increasingly being used in a vast array of civilian
and governmental situations.62 An example of a future law enforcement

54. In Brazil, drones are being used to survey the growth patterns of soybeans and
sugar cane. Paul Marks, Civilian Drones to Fill the Skies after Law Shake-up, NEW
SCIENTIST (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21328506.200-civiliandrones-to-fill-the-skies-after-law-shakeup.html#.UeQ0fRNOldg. In Japan, farmers are
using small drones to spray crops with pesticides. W.J. Hennigan, Idea of Civilians Using
Drone Aircraft May Soon Fly with FAA, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/27/business/la-fi-drones-for-profit-20111127.
55. Teams from Australia and South Wales used remote controlled helicopter
drones to map the progress of the growth of moss beds to determine climate change. The
drone technology was needed because satellite imagery was insufficient. Arko Lucieer,
UAV
Antarctic
Moss
Bed
Case
Study,
ARKO
LUCIEER
RESEARCH,
http://www.lucieer.net/research/uav3.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). In Russia, archaeologists used a thirty-eight ounce, twenty-seven inch helicopter drone to create a 3-D model
of burial mounds over 2,000 years old. Tiny Drones Used in Archaeology, RUSSIAN
UNMANNED VEHICLE SYSTEMS ASSOCIATION (Sept. 7, 2011), http://en.ruvsa.com/news/
unmanned_systems_development/tiny_drones_used_in_archaeology/.
56. In Germany, small drones are used to inspect the blades of the country’s almost
22,000 wind turbines. This alleviates the need for workers to have to climb the turbines
and visually inspect the blades. In France, TGV trains travelling at 200 m.p.h. use helicopter drones to film the track in order to find potentially harmful dents. Marks, supra
note 54.
57. Sabatini, supra note 40.
58. From 2005 to 2012, the percentage of military drones grew from five to thirtyone percent. The U.S. military now possesses 7,494 drones. Spencer Ackerman & Noah
Shactman, Almost 1 in 3 U.S. Warplanes Is a Robot, WIRED (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/01/drone-report/.
59. CBP operates seven Predator B drones along the Mexican and Canadian borders. The drones are remotely operated by pilots in Arizona, North Dakota, and Florida.
Crump & Stanley, supra note 27.
60. Under an agreement signed by President Obama and the Mexican government,
the U.S. is authorized, and has operated, unarmed drones to fly over Mexican territory in
an effort to combat the Mexican drug trade. Spencer Ackerman, U.S. Drones Are Now
Sniffing Mexican Drugs, WIRED (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/
2011/03/u-s-drones-are-now-sniffing-mexican-drugs/.
61. For a list of several law enforcement agencies already operating or owning
drones, see Crump & Stanley, supra note 27.
62. Draganfly’s “Draganflyer X4” boasts government, industrial, educational, and
professional applications such as using the Draganflyer X4 to take pictures of real estate
properties
up
for
sale.
Applications,
DRAGANFLY
INNOVATIONS,
INC.,
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drone is AeroVironment’s “Qube,” already advertised as “targeting the
needs of first responders.”63 Among the highlighted features of the
Qube is its size,64 mobility,65 and advanced technology.66 Smaller
drones, like the Qube, will cost significantly less than current police
helicopters.67
In response to the growing interest in domestic drones, a need for
the development of regulatory standards has been recognized.68 Since
1958 the FAA has been charged with ensuring the safe and efficient operation of aircraft in national airspace.69 Therefore, the FAA will regulate the operation of domestic drones since drones will be flown in the
national airspace.70 Under current FAA policy, unmanned aircraft use
is prohibited in the National Airspace System without specific FAA authorization.71 In light of increasing demand for drones and several safety concerns with drone operation in the national airspace, the FAA published guidelines for operating drones in 2007.72 These FAA guidelines

http://www.draganfly.com/uav-helicopter/draganflyer-x4/applications/ (last visited Oct. 7,
2013).
63. Qube: Public Saftey Small UAS, supra note 23.
64. Qube Overview, AEROVIRONMENT, http://www.avinc.com/downloads/Qubedata
sheet.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2013) (the Qube is only three feet long and weighs a mere
five and one-half pounds).
65. Id. The Qube is able to engage in a forty minute flight, has a range of one kilometer or just over half a mile and has a maximum altitude of 500 feet. It also has a “quiet,
hover-and-stare capability.” Id.
66. For example, AeroVironment’s “Qube” is operated by a tablet computer in which
the operator needs only to use the touchscreen map to direct the Qube. The tablet transmits a live video of the images from the Qube, which is equipped with a high-resolution
color camera and a thermal camera. Id.
67. The Qube has been estimated to cost around $40,000.00. Id. Whereas the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department reported that it bought twelve new helicopters for
$1.7 million each. Hennigan, supra note 54. Further, it has been suggested that an increase of camera surveillance might lead to fewer complaints against officers, which
would reduce the cost of litigation and officer investigations. Hanna, supra note 17.
68. The FAA has estimated as many as 30,000 drones will be in the national airspace within ten years. David Uberti, Rise of the Machines: Domestic Drones Take Off,
MEDILL NATIONAL SECURITY ZONE (Apr. 3, 2012), http://nationalsecurityzone.org/site/riseof-the-machines-domestic-drones-take-off/.
69. On August 23, 1958, the Federal Aviation Act was signed into law and the FAA
was created. A Brief History of the FAA, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (Feb. 1,
2010), http://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/. The FAA’s stated mission is to
“provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.” Mission, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.faa.gov/about/mission/.
70. See generally Sabatini, supra note 40.
71. This authority differs depending on the intended use of the UAV; for public use
an operator must be issued a COA; for civil use an operator must be issued a special airworthiness certificate; for model aircraft use an operator is guided by AC 91-57. R. J. Van
Vuren, Advisory Circular 91-57, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (June 9, 1981),
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/91-57.pdf.
72. Sabatini, supra note 40.
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distinguish between civil and public drone use. 73 For civil drone use to
be authorized, the operator must be issued a Special Airworthiness
Certificate.74 The FAA presently only issues a Special Airworthiness
Certificate for experimental uses. 75 An operator who has been issued
an experimental certificate may not use a drone for “compensation or
hire.”76 The FAA denotes law enforcement drone use as “public use.” 77
For public operation of a drone, the law enforcement entity must be issued a Certification of Authorization or Waiver (“COA”).78 The COA
outlines the limitations on the use of the drone.79 The operator of the
drone must also meet certain FAA requirements.80
On February 14, 2012, President Obama signed into law the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.81 The Act not only details FAA
funding for the next four years but also mandates the FAA to develop
guidelines for civil and public unmanned aircraft integration into the
national airspace.82 The Act ultimately requires the FAA to have implemented regulations for public and civilian drone use by December
2015.83 The Act expressly directs the FAA to permit law enforcement

73. Id.
74. Applicants must describe the design and manufacture of their UAV and demonstrate that it can operate within a designated test area without causing harm to the public. When the certificate is issued to the operator, addition limitations applicable to that
particular UAV will be assigned. Unmanned Aircraft Systems Certifications and Authorizations, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 19, 2013) http://www.faa.gov/about/
initiatives/uas/cert/ [hereinafter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Certifications].
75. The FAA lists six purposes for the special airworthiness certificates to be issued
in the experimental category: research and development, showing compliance with regulations, crew training, exhibition, air racing and market surveys. Experimental Category,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (June 7, 2011) http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert
/airworthiness_certification/sp_awcert/experiment/.
76. Sabatini, supra note 40.
77. Id.
78. The COA gives FAA approval for specific drone flight operation. Van Vuren, supra 71.
79. Unmanned Aircraft Systems Certifications, supra note 74; Aircraft Systems Certifications and Authorizations, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 19, 2013),
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/cert/ (the FAA objective for issuing a COA is to
ensure that the drone is operated at the equivalent safety level as manned aircraft. When
issued the FAA COA, the public entity is only permitted use with the particular drone,
purpose, and area specified in the COA).
80. Qube: Public Safety Small UAS, supra note 23 (restrictions on operators include medical tests, training requirements and knowledge of FAA regulations and operation of the drone).
81. Bill Summary & Status H.R. 658, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d112:HR00658:@@@R (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
82. Pub. L. No. 112-95, §331-34, 126 Stat. 77 (2012).
83. The Act gives the FAA several deadlines regarding the integration of governmental and civilian drone use. FAA guidelines for government drone use must be issued
by November 10, 2012 and the final regulations must be in place by December 31, 2015.
The FAA has been directed to produce recommendations to Congress regarding the operation of civil drone operation by February 14, 2013. By August 14, 2014, the FAA must
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operation of unmanned aircraft that weigh less than 4.4 pounds under
specified restrictions.84
The FAA’s stated mission and focus while working to integrate
unmanned aircraft into the national airspace is safety. 85 One of the biggest safety concerns over the integration of drones into the national airspace is the absence of a “sense and avoid” capability in most drones. 86
Recent crashes87 and hacks88 have also raised safety concerns over the
future nationwide use of drones. In response to the Act, the FAA has
started making changes to the current unmanned aircraft guidelines. 89
The process for publicly operated drones remains similar to the 2007
process, requiring law enforcement agencies to first apply for a COA.90
This COA will serve training and evaluation purposes and if the agency
can prove to be proficient in flying its drone it will be granted an operational COA.91
Along with safety concerns, privacy concerns have also developed
over the authorization of governmental domestic drone use. 92

publish a final rule permitting the operation of small civilian drones. December 14, 2015
is the deadline for the FAA to implement guidelines for the operation of civilian drones in
national airspace. Harley Geiger, Drone Countdown, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND
TECHNOLOGY (Mar. 27, 2012), https://www.cdt.org/blogs/harley-geiger/2703dronecountdown.
84. The Act mandates authorization of “government public safety” operation of an
unmanned aircraft that weighs under 4.4 pounds and meets the following restrictions: the
aircraft must be flown within the sightline of the operator, the aircraft can only be flown
less than 400 feet from the ground, the aircraft can only be flown during daylight, and the
flight must take place more than five miles from an airport. FAA Makes Progress with
UAS Integration, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (May 14, 2012), http://www.faa.gov/
news/updates/?newsId=68004.
85. Id.
86. The sense and avoid capability in aircrafts allows the aircraft to maintain a safe
distance from other aircraft and avoid collisions. Pub. L. No. 112-95, §331, 126 Stat. 77
(2012); Russ Niles, Drone Tests to Expand, AVWEB (Aug. 28, 2011),
http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/Drone_Tests_To_Expand_205285-1.html.
87. In June 2012, a forty-four foot Navy drone crashed into an uninhabited area in
Maryland. Ackerman, supra note 26. In December 2012, a Mexican drone crashed into an
El Paso, Texas private backyard. Mexican Drone Crashes in South Texas, CBS NEWS (Dec.
17, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-7159594.html.
88. University of Texas researchers demonstrated the ability to hack and trick a
drone into following the hacker’s GPS instructions instead of the operator’s. This presents a potential for in-air collisions with other aircraft and if the drone is armed can be
an even more dangerous situation. Harper, supra note 26.
89. The FAA developed an online COA application system in an effort to expedite
the process. The length of authorization for a drone flight has been changed from twelve
months to twenty-four months. The FAA now operates a new UAS integration office. FAA
Makes Progress with UAS Integration, supra note 84.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Crump & Stanley, supra note 27; Pete Kasperowicz, Sen. Paul Proposes Bill
Protecting Americans From Drone Surveillance, THE HILL (June 13, 2012),

2013] WARRANTLESS GOVERNMENT DRONE SURVEILLANCE

167

The general privacy concern is that drone use will infringe upon areas
protected under the Fourth Amendment, areas in which individuals enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy.93 Privacy concerns have already
been raised regarding the use of drones for surveillance along the Canadian and Mexican borders. 94 New advances in drone technologies increase such privacy concerns. 95 Many privacy organizations have called
for the FAA to include privacy concerns in the new regulations of unmanned aerial vehicles.96 However, it has also been suggested that the
FAA is not properly equipped to create regulations that properly consider individual privacy.97 There is also concern that knowledge that an
individual’s daily movements will be under constant surveillance could
lead to an overall chilling of First Amendment protected expressions.98
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has also expressed concerns over law enforcement drones being used for mass tracking and
surveillance of civilians and the amount of time that images and data
collected from drones will be retained.99
In response to the several privacy concerns expressed over governmental drone use, state and federal legislation has been proposed.100
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/232489-sen-paul-proposes-bill-protect
ing-americans-from-drone-surveillance.
93. Crump & Stanley, supra note 27.
94. The Predator B drone has the ability to “identify an object the size of a milk carton from an altitude of 60,000 feet.” 70-75% of Canadians live within five miles of the
U.S. border and millions of Mexicans live within ten miles of the U.S. border. Posner on
the Privacy Implications of Unmanned Aerial Border Surveillance, 2011 EMERGING
ISSUES 6022 (Oct. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Posner on the Privacy Implications].
95. Researchers at Progeny Systems Corporation, who have recently won a contract
with the United States Army, are working on developing facial recognition technology for
drones. Noah Shachtman, Army Tracking Plan: Drones that Never Forget a Face, WIRED
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/drones-never-forget-a-face/.
A former Air Force contractor and a former Air Force consultant designed and displayed a fourteen pound, six foot UAV named “WASP.” It is an autonomous UAV that is
capable of posing as a cell phone tower to trick cell phones into connecting with the WASP
instead of their phone carriers. This gives the WASP the ability to eavesdrop on an individual’s cell phone conversations. Clay Dillow, A DIY UAV That Hacks Wi-Fi Networks,
Cracks Passwords, and Poses As A Cell Phone Tower, POPULAR SCIENCE (July 29, 2011),
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-07/diy-uav-hacks-wi-fi-networks-cracks-pas
swords-and-poses-cell-phone-tower.
96. Jay Stanley, New Eyes in the Sky: Protecting Privacy from Domestic Drone Surveillance, ACLU (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technologyand-liberty/new-eyes-sky-protecting-privacy-domestic-drone.
97. Benjamin Wittes & John Villasenor, Drones and the FAA: A Bad Match, WASH.
POST (Apr. 20, 2012) available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-31196943.html (suggests that to “ask the FAA to take on the role of privacy czar for UAVs would be a mistake”).
98. Crump & Stanley, supra note 27.
99. Id.
100. A bill is being developed by Delegate C. Todd Gilbert (R. Woodstock) and the
Virginia ACLU to regulate the use of drones in Virginia. The legislation would ban government drone use unless a search warrant based on probable cause has been obtained or

168

J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW

[Vol. XXX

The common principle among the proposed legislation is the requirement of a warrant for any governmental drone use subject to certain
exceptions.101 Multiple law enforcement agencies have countered the
privacy concerns by emphasizing that the real motivation for drone use
lies in the life-saving capabilities for officers and civilians.102 Additionally, there have been self-imposed restrictions and guidelines on governmental drone use.103
Unless federal legislation is passed forbidding warrantless governmental drone surveillance, challenges to such use will fall under the
purview of the Fourth Amendment.
PART II: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
A. The Prohibition of Writs of Assistance: The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of individuals in their
property and of their person by prohibiting unreasonable searches and

there is an emergency situation where lives are in danger. The legislation also proposes
restrictions on image retention, the requirement of public notice, and independent audits
of the drone use. ACLU of Virginia and Del. Todd Gilbert Propose Legislation to Regulate
Unmanned Aerial Drones in Virginia, ACLU (July 17, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/ national-security/aclu-virginia-and-del-todd-gilbert-propose-legislation-regulate-unmanned-aer
ial [hereinafter ACLU of Virginia]. H.R. 6199, the Preserving American Privacy Act of
2012 was introduced on July 24, 2012. The Act would not allow state or federal law enforcement to obtain authorization from the FAA to fly a drone in the national airspace
without a warrant. This prohibition would not apply to border patrol or applicable warrant exceptions. H.R. 6199 – Preserving American Privacy Act of 2012, OPEN CONGRESS,
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-h6199/show (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter
H.R. 6199 – Preserving American Privacy]. Senator Rand Paul introduced the Preserving
Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012. The Act prohibits government
drone use without a warrant except for border patrol, circumstances where there is imminent danger to life, and terrorist attacks. The Act also gives an individual standing to sue
the government for violations and prohibits evidence obtained in violation of the Act from
being admissible. Sen. Paul Introduces Bill to Protect Americans Against Unwarranted
Drone Surveillance, RAND PAUL (June 12, 2012), http://paul.senate.gov/?p=press_rel
ease&id=545 [hereinafter Sen. Paul Introduces Bill].
101. See generally ACLU of Virgina, supra note 100; H.R. 6199 – Preserving American Privacy, supra note 100; Sen. Paul Introduces Bill, supra note 100.
102. The UAS Operations Manager at the Mesa County Sheriff’s Office stated that
the two drones that the Office currently uses are employed for search and rescue missions
and taking pictures of crime scenes with “probably one percent” of the drone use for surveillance. Similarly, a member of the Miami-Dade Police Department stated that the department’s drones are used to provide visual support to police units as in hostage situations. Jillian Rayfield, One Nation Under The Drone: The Rising Number of UAVs In
American Skies, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Dec. 22, 2011), http://tpmmuckraker.talking
pointsmemo.com/2011/12/one_nation_under_the_drone.php.
103. The UAS Operations Manager at the Mesa County Sheriff’s Office stated that a
warrant is obtained for drone use occurring under 400 feet. Id.
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seizures.104 The Fourth Amendment can be broken down into two clauses.105 The search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment provides
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.”106 The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment states “no Warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath and affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.”107 The Fourth Amendment was meant to prohibit courts
from issuing general warrants or “writs of assistance”108 instead of
providing a specified cause for intruding on a specific individual.109 The
Fourth Amendment mandates three requirements for a warrant to be
valid: probable cause,110 judicial approval111 and particularity.112 A
search or seizure conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform
to any of these three requirements is unconstitutional.113 Absent exigent circumstances114 and exemptions,115 evidence secured in violation
of these requirements is generally excluded in an effort to deter illegal

104. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (the Constitution does not forbid all searches and seizures, only those that are unreasonable).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The
Fourth
Amendment,
REVOLUTIONARY
WAR
AND
BEYOND,
http://www.revolutionary-war-and-beyond.com/4th-amendment.html (last visited Dec. 19,
2013); Thomas Y. Davis, How Important Should History Be To Resolving Fourth Amendment Questions, And How Good A Job Does The Supreme Court Do In Constructing History?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 51 (2010) (writs of assistance were employed by Parliament
against the American Colonies in response to a rise in smuggling by colonists. The writs
were search warrants allowing a broad search of a property, without notice or a given reason and gave officers the right to question anyone on the premises).
109. Id.
110. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (probable cause is present when
there is a fair probability that evidence will be found in a particular place).
111. Id. at 99 (discussing that an impartial judicial officer must review the affidavit
asking for a warrant to determine its validity).
112. Id. at 98 (stating that particularity requires that the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized must be described in the warrant).
113. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004).
114. Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011) (stating that warrantless searches are permitted in reasonable exigent circumstances, such as to prevent the destruction
of evidence, and the exigent circumstance must not have been created or furthered by police).
115. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) (exceptions to the requirement
of a warrant and probable cause include the inventory search exemption and the administrative inspection exemption. An inventory search allows a search of property already
lawfully seized for the purposes of ensuring it is harmless, securing any valuable items
and protecting against false claims of damage. An administrative inspection is an inspection by authorities for regulatory purposes such as an unannounced inspection of a business for safety compliance).
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police conduct and uphold judicial integrity.116 An individual can give
his non-coerced consent to a warrantless search under the Fourth
Amendment.117
In a warrantless search or seizure situation, the inquiry becomes
whether the government’s intrusion upon an individual’s privacy and
property is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.118 A warrantless
search or seizure within an individual’s home is presumed unreasonable and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment.119 Generally, a
warrantless search or seizure must be within a limited scope and level
of intrusiveness.120 Therefore, a search or seizure can become unreasonable if it goes beyond a reasonable scope or level of intrusiveness
even if it was reasonable at its inception.121
B. From Property to Privacy: The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment
The advancement of technology has in turn produced more efficient and detailed governmental surveillance. The Supreme Court has
been faced with challenges under the Fourth Amendment against warrantless searches involving various modes of surveillance equipment.122
While early Court decisions turned up whether or not there had been a
physical trespass upon an individual, the Katz decision altered this perception and developed the standard under which electronic surveillance
is analyzed today.123 This evolution can be best understood by reviewing the timeline of various surveillance tools challenged under the
Fourth Amendment.

116. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (stating that excluding evidence acquired by
means violating the Fourth Amendment serves principally to discourage “lawless police
conduct” and without such an exclusionary effect the only deterrent would be the “mere
words” of the Fourth Amendment). Id. at 13 (excluding such evidence upholds judicial integrity by prohibiting the use of the fruits of illegal searches and seizures. The admission
of evidence in a judicial proceeding has a legitimizing effect on the methods or conduct by
which the evidence was procured).
117. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (consent must be voluntarily given and not the product of coercion or duress from law enforcement). Id. at 243 (the
conduct of the search must be the same as if the police had obtained a warrant).
118. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
119. Groh, 540 U.S. at 559.
120. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-30.
121. Id. (determining that a “stop and frisk” is permitted when limited to the scope of
the officer seeking to discover hidden weapons that present a danger to the officer and
when limited in intrusiveness to patting down the suspect as opposed to reaching in pockets or under clothing).
122. See generally Smith v. Maryland 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (the governmental use of a
pen register); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (the governmental use of a thermal imaging device); Goldman v. United States, 277 U.S. 129 (1942) (the governmental
use of a spike mike).
123. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967).

2013] WARRANTLESS GOVERNMENT DRONE SURVEILLANCE

171

1. Big Brother is Listening: The Fourth Amendment, Listening Devices,
and the Emergence of the Katz Test
Wiretapping an individual’s telephone is one of the first major
technological advancements utilized for government surveillance and is
challenged as an unreasonable search.124 Earlier Supreme Court decisions regarding governmental eavesdropping revolved around whether
or not there had been some form of a physical intrusion upon the location of the conversations.125 In some instances, the level of physical intrusion was a matter of “fractions of inches.”126
In Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court considered
whether the warrantless wiretapping of defendants for five months in
both their offices and homes constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment.127 The Court held that there was no search under the
Fourth Amendment as there was no physical search or seizure upon the
defendants.128 The Court stated that the historical purpose of the
Fourth Amendment was to prevent forceful searches and seizures of a
man’s house, property, person, and effects by the government. 129 Therefore, a violation of the Fourth Amendment required a warrantless physical intrusion upon an individual or his home. 130 Since the actual wiretapping of defendants’ home and office occurred in public streets, there
was no physical intrusion upon the individuals.131 The Court dismissed
the argument that the wiretap had augmented the officers’ sense of
hearing and held that the evidence was acquired by “the use of sense of
hearing and that only.”132
Similarly, in Goldman v. United States, the Supreme Court found
no search had occurred when officers listened in on defendant’s
conversation through the use of a detectaphone133 in the next room. 134
Without a warrant, officers placed a detectaphone up to the wall adjoining defendant’s office and transcribed the overheard conversations.135
124. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 438 (1928).
125. See id. at 466 (stating that the Fourth Amendment requires an actual physical
invasion of the person or property); see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961) (discussing that the level of physical intrusion does not matter so long as there is
an actual, physical intrusion).
126. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512.
127. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457.
128. Id. at 465.
129. Id. at 463.
130. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942) (holding that a detectaphone is a listening device employing a receiver with the capability of amplifying sounds
through an attached set of earphones).
134. Id. at 134.
135. Id. at 131-32.
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The defendant argued that despite the lack of a physical intrusion into
the office, an individual expects that conversations held in his private
office will not be subject to outside eavesdropping.136 The defendant’s
argument was dismissed; and in accordance with Olmstead, the Court
held since there was no physical entry upon the defendant’s office there
was no search under the Fourth Amendment.137
In Silverman v. United States, the Supreme Court considered
whether the warrantless use of a spike mike138 to listen in on the defendants constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.139 Officers
believed that the defendants’ residence was being used as a gambling
headquarters.140 After officers gained permissible access to an adjacent
house, they installed a spike mike to listen to the defendants’ conversations next door.141 The spike mike was inserted under a baseboard and
through a gap between the two houses until it contacted a heating duct
leading into the defendants’ house.142 Distinguishing Goldman and
Olmstead, the Court held that since there had been a physical intrusion
upon the defendants, there was a search under the Fourth Amendment.143 The Court dismissed the lower court’s refusal to find a physical
intrusion based on the “fraction of inches” with which the spike mike
made contact with the defendants’ heating duct and instead held that a
physical intrusion, no matter how minor, violated the Fourth Amendment.144
The Supreme Court’s focus on the element of physical intrusion
was altered by the decision in Katz v. United States.145 Officers attached
a listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth, which the
defendant had been known to use to place gambling bets. 146
Officers used this device to listen to and record the defendant’s conversations.147 The Court rejected the government’s argument that since the
defendant was in a public phone booth, he willingly exposed his conversations to the public.148 Instead, the Court stressed that public activi-

136. Id. at 135.
137. Id.
138. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 505 (1961) (holding that a spike mike
is a microphone with a foot long spike attached and allows listening through the use of
headphones).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 506.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 507.
143. Id. at 511.
144. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
145. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967).
146. Id. at 348.
147. The defendant was subsequently convicted of violating federal statutes based on
the content of his recorded conversations. Id.
148. Id. at 352.
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ties sought to remain private may be protected under the Fourth
Amendment.149 Therefore, by shutting the phone booth door and paying
the fee, the defendant was entitled to assume that his conversations inside the phone booth would not be “broadcast to the world.”150 The
Court then rejected the argument that without a physical intrusion upon the phone booth there was no search.151 Instead the Court embraced
the notion of a technical trespass, stating that the Fourth Amendment
protects “people, not places” so a physical intrusion is not required for
the Fourth Amendment to be violated.152
The importance of the Katz decision rests upon not only the rejection of a physical requirement for Fourth Amendment protection, but
also in what has become known as the Katz test.153 In his concurrence,
Justice Harlan stated that for a technical, non-physical trespass, the
inquiry is first whether an individual has manifested an actual or subjective expectation of privacy and second whether that expectation is
one that society is objectively prepared to recognize as reasonable.154
Thus, in the Katz case the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy by shutting the door to the phone booth and paying the
fee to make the phone call.155 Society recognizes an expectation that
conversations held in a phone booth will be private and not intruded
upon.156
Equally important to Fourth Amendment analysis is the differing
levels of protection dependent on where law enforcement observations
take place.
2. Curtilage v. Open Fields: Where Fourth Amendment Protection Can
Be Asserted
The highest level of protection the Fourth Amendment affords is in
the “sanctity of the home.”157 There is a great level of protection against
unwarranted government intrusions within an individual’s home. 158
The Fourth Amendment also provides protection for business offices
and commercial buildings but to a lesser extent than that of the
home.159 Similarly, the level of Fourth Amendment protection extended

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
Id.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
Id.
Id.
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to automobiles is not equivalent to the level of protection provided to an
individual’s home.160 When reviewing challenges to police observations
under the Fourth Amendment the Supreme Court distinguishes between areas within the curtilage of the home and areas covered by the
open fields doctrine.161
The open fields doctrine originated in 1924, when the Court rejected the defendant’s claim that his jug of moonshine had been illegally
searched under the Fourth Amendment. 162 The defendant argued that
the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer searched
the defendant’s jug without a warrant while the jug was still on his father’s land.163 Justice Holmes stated that the Fourth Amendment protection to people in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects” does not
extend to open fields.164 The Court has subsequently held that there is
no constitutional difference between police observations conducted in a
public place and observations conducted while standing in the open
fields.165 Therefore, the open fields doctrine allows warrantless observations or surveillance by law enforcement because there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy within an area designated an open field.166
On the other hand, areas considered to be curtilage of the home
are given Fourth Amendment protection.167 Curtilage is an area in

160. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (recognizing the Court has an “automobile exception” permitting officers to perform a warrantless search of an individual’s
car where there is probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband. Under this exception, the officer may lawfully search the entire vehicle including compartments and any
containers therein, citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982)).
161. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) (areas considered to
be part of the curtilage of the home are afforded protection under the Fourth Amendment
whereas areas considered to be part of open fields are not).
162. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
163. Id. Based on information that Hester was manufacturing moonshine, officers
went to his father’s house and observed the house from a hundred yards away. Id. at 58.
During this observation officers saw Hester come out of the home and hand another man
a jug. Id. The men were alerted to the presence of the officers and started to run. Id.
While in pursuit Hester dropped the jug and officers examined the broken remains of the
jug eventually determining that it had contained moonshine. Id.
164. Id. at 59. Hester argued that the officers had been on his land; therefore, they
trespassing when they searched and seized the evidence of the moonshine. Id. at 58. The
Court stated that even if there had been a trespass, Hester’s acts were committed out in
the open and disclosed the jug to the officers. Id. The Court then emphasized that the officers did not obtain the evidence by an entry into Hester’s house and the Fourth Amendment does not extend to areas outside of the home. Id. at 59.
165. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 170 (1984).
166. The term “open fields” can be deceiving. Id. at 181. Open fields does not necessarily mean open land or literally a field. Id. at 180. Open fields for Fourth Amendment
purposes can include undeveloped land such as wooded areas. Id.
167. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (stating that the language of
the Fourth Amendment itself denotes protection of the home and so the concept of curtilage extends this protection to areas immediately surrounding the home and areas
thought to be associated with the home).
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which intimate activities that are associated with the privacy of one’s
home occur.168 Such an area is considered part of the home for determination of Fourth Amendment protection.169 In determining whether the
area in question contains such intimate and private activities associated with the home, the Supreme Court looks at several factors including
proximity of the disputed area to the home, the nature of the uses within the disputed area, and any steps taken to protect the area from public or private observation.170 However, Supreme Court precedent shows
the determination between curtilage and open fields has been incongruous.171
In Oliver v. United States, the Court considered two consolidated
cases that involved the issue of whether the open fields doctrine permitted officers to enter and search defendant’s secluded property without a
warrant.172 In the first case, officers investigated an anonymous tip that
the defendant had been growing marijuana on his farm. 173 Without a
warrant or probable cause,174 the officers arrived at the defendant’s
farm, entered onto property, and came upon a locked gate with a “No
Trespassing” sign.175 Officers followed a footpath for several hundred
yards that led around the locked gate and found a field of marijuana on
defendant’s farm.176 The field was a relatively secluded area over a mile
from defendant’s home.177 The defendant was subsequently arrested
and challenged the discovery of the marijuana field as an illegal search
of a protected curtilage area.178 In the second case, officers similarly
investigated a tip that the defendants were growing marijuana in the
woods located behind his residence.179 The officers gained access to the
wooded area through a path located between the defendants’ residence

168. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
169. Id. (defining the concept of curtilage as “the area around the home to which the
activity of home life extends”).
170. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.
171. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 175 (1984).
172. Id. at 170.
173. Id. at 174.
174. Id. at 173 (discussing that the officers admitted that they did not have a warrant or probable cause to obtain a search, and there were no exceptional circumstances
allowing them to enter upon defendant’s farm).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 173-74.
177. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173-74 (1984).
178. Id. at 173 (stating that the District Court agreed and suppressed the evidence
while the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the officers were within open
fields and reversed the District Court. The District Court held that the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy as to the fields, which did not fall within the open fields
doctrine. The Sixth Circuit held that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test did
not conflict with the open fields doctrine as activities that take place within open fields
are not subject to an expectation of privacy).
179. Id. at 170.

176

J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW

[Vol. XXX

and a neighboring house.180 The officers came upon two fenced-in areas
with “No Trespassing” signs and observed that these areas contained
marijuana.181
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the appropriate
legal standard in determining whether the warrantless searches of the
two disputed areas violated the Fourth Amendment. 182 The Court held
in both cases that the open fields doctrine was applicable.183 While the
name “open fields doctrine” might imply application literally only to
open fields, the Court stated that such an area need not be either open
or a field.184 Therefore, the wooded area surrounding the defendants’
residence in the second case fell under the open fields doctrine.185
The Court discounted the measures taken by both defendants of
posting “No Trespassing” signs, erecting fences around the property,
and conducting their activities in secluded areas.186 These measures
may have proven a subjective expectation of privacy, but this expectation was not legitimate for Fourth Amendment protections because society is not prepared to protect any expectation of privacy in open, secluded fields.187 The Court refused to adopt a case-by-case analysis of
whether an open field was subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.188 Additionally, the Court dismissed a connection between the
defendants’ possible claim for trespass for the officer’s presence on their
property and a claim under the Fourth Amendment. 189 The law of tres180. Id.
181. Id. (the state trial court suppressed the evidence holding that the open fields
doctrine was inapplicable and the state’s highest court upheld the suppression of the evidence).
182. Id. at 175.
183. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 175 (1984).
184. Id. at 180.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 182 (stating that not only do “No Trespassing” signs not block the public
from viewing open fields but also that the Framers could not have intended the Fourth
Amendment to protect criminal activity simply because individuals post “No Trespassing”
signs and other barriers).
187. Id. Open fields are not settings for such intimate activities that the Fourth
Amendment is intended to protect from government interference. Id. at 179. As such, society has no interest in protecting the activities that occur in open fields such as growing
crops. Id. Further, usually these fields are open and accessible to the public, defeating
any claim to privacy by the owner. Id.
188. Id. at 181-82 (the Court denying this approach for the following two reasons: (i)
a case-by-case analysis would undo the balance between law enforcement needs and interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as it would require officers to make a guess
as to whether or not an individual had adequately manifested a reasonable expectation of
privacy in an open field before he entered the area; and (ii) most of the areas considered
open fields are not in proximity to any area that can be considered part of the curtilage
and that in most cases the lines between the home and open fields will be clear and easily
understood from “our daily experience”).
189. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984). The defendants argued that
the officers were physically trespassing on their property. The Court dismissed this ar-
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pass is broader than that of the Fourth Amendment and protects interests that have no ties to privacy. 190 The defendants’ ownership of the
land that the officers entered and searched is only one element to be
considered in a Fourth Amendment analysis to determine a legitimate
reasonable expectation of privacy.191
The following year, in Dow Chemical Company v. United States,
the Supreme Court considered whether warrantless aerial surveillance
by government officials of commercial property fell under the open
fields doctrine.192 The Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”) maintained a
2,000-acre facility consisting of both covered buildings and exposed
manufacturing equipment.193 The Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) employed an aerial photographer to take photographs from altitudes of 12,000 to 1,200 feet of the Dow plant for regulatory compliance purposes.194 The EPA neither informed Dow of this observation
nor obtained a search warrant.195 Dow argued that the observation by
the EPA constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment and violated its trade secret protections.196 The Supreme Court dismissed Dow’s
trade secret claim and focused on whether the industrial complex constituted curtilage or an open field area.197 The Court recognized Dow’s
legitimate expectation of privacy within the buildings but refused to extend this protection to the exposed, outdoor areas of a manufacturing
complex because it lacks the presence of any intimate activities such as
those associated with one’s home.198 The Court noted, however, if more
sophisticated equipment had been used to reveal intimate activities or
private conversations, the analysis would be different. 199

gument by stating that the existence of a violation of an individual’s property right is only
one element to consider when determining reasonable privacy expectations. Id. Even
when the individual has a property interest, there still may be an insufficient or unreasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
190. Id. at 184.
191. Id.
192. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 227 (1985).
193. Id. at 231.
194. Id. at 232.
195. Id.
196. Id. (dismissing the trade secret claim stating that the role of the EPA was to
regulate and not to compete with Dow and if the EPA were to use the photographs in such
a way Dow might have a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment).
197. Id.
198. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the majority’s distinction that while Dow was entitled to protection against physical entry into any of their buildings, there was no protection against
warrantless observations from the air. Id. at 250 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent further questioned the majority’s holding that society was not willing to extend an expectation of privacy to an industrial complex arguing that the existence of trade secret protection laws showed society’s recognition of a right in industrial privacy. Id.
199. Id. at 239 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Following Dow Chemical Co. the Supreme Court addressed the
open fields doctrine once again in United States v. Dunn.200 Federal
agents obtained a warrant to place beepers in equipment bought by the
defendant in order to track him while he was driving his truck. 201 The
trip ended at the defendant’s 198-acre ranch.202 The ranch was surrounded by an outer perimeter fence and several inner barbed wire
fences including one around the defendant’s home.203 Two barns were
located from his home, the larger of which the defendant closed off by a
wooden fence and waist level locked gates.204 Above the locked gates
was an overhang and from the top of the gates to the overhang was fish
netting intended to obscure the view into the barn.205 Without securing
a search warrant, the officers crossed the outer perimeter fence, one of
the inner barbed wire fences, and the wooden fence in front of the larger barn.206 The officers smelled chemicals emanating from the barn and
heard the sound of a running motor from within the barn.207 Although
they did not enter the barn, they walked under the overhang and
shined a flashlight through the netting into the barn.208 The officers
then observed what they believed to be a drug laboratory.209 The officers left and returned to the ranch twice the next day to confirm that
they saw a drug laboratory before obtaining a warrant to seizure the
contents of the barn.210
The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s barn and the area
surrounding it were not within the curtilage of defendant’s home and
focused on four main points.211 First, the proximity of the immediate
barn area was fifty yards from the fence where the officers had first
observed the barn and sixty yards from the defendant’s home. 212 This
was too far of a distance for the barn area to be considered associated
with the defendant’s home.213 Second, the separate fences erected between the barn and house manifested a separation between the barn

200. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 294 (1987).
201. Id. at 296.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 297.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1987). After entering the
premises through the outer perimeter fence, officers crossed over an inner barbed wire
fence and first approached the second barn. After only observing empty boxes in the second barn they then crossed another inner barbed wire fence to the second barn. Id.
207. Id. at 298.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 301.
212. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987).
213. Id.
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and the residence.214 Third, the officers gathered information prior to
shining a light into the barn, which allowed them to determine that the
barn was not an area defendant used for private activities. 215 Specifically, the officers observed defendant’s truck, with the equipment at issue,
being backed into the barn, heard a motor running as they approached
the barn, and followed the odor of the chemicals to the barn.216 Finally,
the defendant did not take effective measures to protect the disputed
barn area from observation of the surrounding open fields.217
The defendant argued that he had manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy by erecting several different fences around the barn
area.218 The Supreme Court dismissed this argument and held that the
purpose of the fences were functional to the ranch and were not intended to prevent outside observation of the activities within the fenced-in
area.219 While the Court recognized that the defendant’s barn itself was
a protected area that could not be entered without a search warrant,
there was no entry into the barn itself or entry into any structure on
the defendant’s property.220 The Court likened the officers shining the
flashlight into the barn to previous decisions upholding officers shining
a flashlight into the interior of a suspect’s car without a warrant.221 Accordingly, the Court held that the officer’s use of the flashlight directed
at the netted opening of the barn did not render their observations an
illegal search.222
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the barn was protected
curtilage and the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the contents inside the barn under the Katz test.223 Justice Brennan
noted several state and federal cases holding the general rule that a
barn is part of the curtilage of a farmhouse in recognition of the im-

214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 303 (stating that they had been drawn towards the second barn due to
the smell of phenyl acetic acid, the officers noted that the smell became the strongest
when they approached the second barn).
217. Id.
218. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1987).
219. See id. at 303 (stating that the inner barbed wire fences on the defendant’s
property were “typical ranch” fences used to control livestock. The fences were described
as wooden posts with various strings of barbed wire between the posts).
220. Id. at 303-04.
221. Id. at 305 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) and United States
v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). The dissent emphasized that the opening through which officers had shined their
flashlight required them to stand immediately in front of the netting and under the barn’s
overhang as standing even a few feet away would render visibility obscured. Additionally,
the defendant’s residence was not visible from either the public road or from the outer perimeter fence. Id.
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portant role barns play in rural life.224 Justice Brennan also criticized
the majority’s view on the distance between the barn and the residence,225 the role of the fences, 226 the importance of the officers smelling
the chemicals,227 and the defendant’s ineffective protective measures
against observation.228
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device
was not a search because the device was limited in scope and only detected heat radiations.229 Acting on a tip that the defendant was growing marijuana in his home, officers pointed the thermal imaging device
at the defendant’s home in an effort to detect any unusual heat sources
inside the home.230 The Court held that despite the fact that the device
was only able to detect heat sources within the defendant’s home, those
heat sources could identify intimate and private activities that the
Fourth Amendment protects. 231 In order to obtain the information that
the thermal imaging device relayed, the officers would have had to
physically enter the defendant’s home without a warrant. 232 The Court
noted that while the thermal imaging device at issue was relatively
crude, the Court must take into account more sophisticated surveillance devices that were already in use or being developed.233 Failing to
recognize the privacy interests that are violated by the use of heat im-

224. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 307-08 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
226. There was a “well walked” path connecting the barn to the residence and the
barn, the residence and other outbuildings were cluster in a clearing together apart from
the surrounding wooded area. Id.
227. Id. at 310-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan discounted the majority’s emphasis on the officer’s smelling the odor of the chemicals and hearing the running
motor. Justice Brenan argued that the officers were already in a protected curtilage area
between the barns and the farmhouse and the evidence was gathered after an intrusion
had occurred and therefore did not justify the intrusion for occurring in the first place.
Further, a running motor inside the barn was not conclusive evidence of a non-domestic
use. Id.
228. Id. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan criticized the majority’s
view that the defendant did not take adequate measures to protect the barn area from
observation by officers standing in open fields. Justice Brennan emphasized that defendant indeed took various protective steps and the Fourth Amendment does not require “the
posting of a twenty-four hour guard to preserve an expectation of privacy.” Id. Specifically, the defendant had locked his driveway, fenced in the barn and covered the barn’s front
opening with a locked gate and fishnet to obscure visibility. Id.
229. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 38 (stating that by monitoring the heat sources in an individual’s home,
law enforcement could determine at “what hour each night the lady of the house takes her
daily sauna”).
232. Id. at 40.
233. Id. at 36.
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aging would leave the door open for more invasive surveillance of an
individual’s home.234
Fourth Amendment protection can vary depending on where the
challenged government activity takes place. Warrantless searches are
permitted under the open fields doctrine because it stands for the idea
that an individual cannot reasonably expect privacy protection for activities conducted outside the home in areas that cannot be considered
part of the curtilage of the home.235 Accordingly, protection against unreasonable search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment can turn
on whether the area is deemed to be curtilage or open fields, and as Supreme Court precedent shows, this distinction has not been easily made
or uniformly applied.236
Since the inception of the Katz test, the Supreme Court has applied the Katz analysis when faced with forms of electronic or nonphysically intrusive forms of governmental surveillance. As these cases
show, the open fields doctrine and the Katz test are intertwined and
crucial to the determination of the constitutionality of warrantless government drone use.
3. Big Brother is Watching: Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment
Despite differences in the type of aircraft used,237 altitude,238 and
type of area239 observed by law enforcement, the Supreme Court did not
hold any of these aerial surveillance cases240 to be a search under the
Fourth Amendment.241 The collection of warrantless governmental aerial surveillance cases exhibit a common application of what is known as
the third party doctrine, which stands for the concept that the Fourth
Amendment does not provide protection to activities or information that
an individual knowingly exposes to the public or a third party.242 As the
234. Id.
235. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 175 (1984).
236. Id. (commenting on the confusion that the open fields doctrine has created in
both state and federal courts).
237. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986) (fixed-wing airplane); see
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989) (helicopter).
238. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207 (1,000 feet); see Riley, 488 U.S. at 445 (400 feet); see
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 227 (1986) (12,000 to 1,000 feet).
239. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207 (defendant’s backyard); see Riley, 488 U.S. at 445
(defendant’s green house); see Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 227 (industrial complex).
240. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207; see Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 227; see Riley, 488
U.S. at 445.
241. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207; see Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 227; see Riley,
488 U.S. at 445.
242. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979) (stating that the Court “consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (stat-
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cases below show, the Supreme Court has consistently applied this concept to warrantless aerial surveillance by law enforcement, holding that
activities exposed to the general public flying overhead are not subject
to Fourth Amendment protection.243
In California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court considered whether
warrantless aerial surveillance of the defendant’s backyard from an altitude of 1,000 feet in a fixed-wing airplane constituted an unreasonable search.244 The defendant erected a 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot
inner fence surrounding his backyard in an effort to block ground-level
observations.245 Without securing a warrant, officers hired a private
plane to fly over the defendant’s backyard at an altitude of 1,000 feet.246
Officers were then able to observe marijuana plants growing in the defendant’s backyard.247 The Court agreed that by erecting the fences
around his yard, the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy from ground-level observations but he could have no reasonable
expectation of privacy from all observations of his yard including those
from legal, navigable airspace.248 Additionally, the Court emphasized
that the officers had made naked-eye observations of the defendant’s
field and had not used any sense-augmenting devices.249 Therefore, had
any member of the public flying in navigable airspace such as the officers were would have been able to observe the defendant’s yard and
what was growing there.250
Three years later the Supreme Court was again faced with low altitude aerial surveillance of an individual’s backyard. In Florida v. Riley, the Court considered whether governmental surveillance of the defendant’s partly enclosed greenhouse at an altitude of 400 feet from a
helicopter constituted a search. 251 The defendant lived on five acres of
rural land, which included his mobile home and a greenhouse ten to
twenty feet behind the mobile home.252 Officers received an anonymous
tip that the defendant had been growing marijuana on his property and
ing “what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”). This concept has become to be known as the
“third party doctrine.” See generally, Erin Smith Dennis, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, the
Fourth Amendment, and Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 737
(2011); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 561
(2009).
243. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,
445 (1989).
244. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207.
245. Id. at 209.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 212.
249. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
250. Id.
251. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989).
252. Id.
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focused on the defendant’s greenhouse.253 The greenhouse was enclosed
on only two sides but the defendant had blocked view from the other
two sides with trees, shrubs and his mobile home. 254 The greenhouse
was also enclosed with a roof but only half of the panels were opaque
and some panels were missing.255 The officer circled over the defendant’s property twice from an altitude of 400 feet and made naked eye
observations of the marijuana inside the greenhouse through the missing roof panels and unenclosed sides.256 The Court held that the aerial
surveillance was not a search under the Fourth Amendment pursuant
to its holding in Ciraolo three years prior.257
The Supreme Court focused on several factors concerning the
manner in which the surveillance was conducted. First, notwithstanding the defendant’s protective measures against observation from the
ground-level, the sides and roof were viewable from the air. 258 Thus, the
defendant could not reasonably expect privacy against private or public
observation from above the greenhouse.259 Second, the helicopter was
flying in FAA authorized airspace.260 The Court dismissed any distinction between the fixed-wing plane in Ciraolo and the use of a
helicopter.261 The Court also dismissed any distinction between the difference in altitude of 1,000 feet of the fixed-plane in Ciraolo and the 400
feet of the helicopter. 262 Rather the Court emphasized the holding in Ciraolo that despite a subjective manifestation of an expectation of priva253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. Surrounding the defendant’s property, including the mobile home and
greenhouse, was a wire fence with a posted “Do Not Enter” sign. The officers were unable
to see inside the greenhouse from the public road by defendant’s property; therefore, they
employed the use of a helicopter to fly over the defendant’s land. Id.
256. Id.
257. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).
258. Id. at 450.
259. Id.
260. Id. Helicopters are not subject to lower limits of navigable airspace as fixedwing aircraft.Id. at 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor’s concurrence questioned the majority’s reliance on FAA regulations in determining whether the aerial surveillance violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. Justice O’Conner stated that the FAA determines whether particular
aircraft can fly at certain altitudes for safety purposes and not in consideration of an individual’s privacy. Id. at 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Therefore, society’s reasonable expectation of privacy in regards to aircraft altitude will not be the same as the FAA’s. Id.
Further, Justice O’Connor questioned the majority’s comparison between police observations of curtilage from the ground-level to police observations of curtilage from navigable
airspace. Id. at 454-55 (O’Connor, J., concurring). An individual may take effective protective measures to obscure observations from public roads or sidewalks such as erecting tall
fences but conversely, individuals cannot obscure all conceivable views of their backyards
from aerial observation without rendering such areas useless. Id. at 454 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
261. Id. at 450.
262. Id.
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cy, the officer was entitled to make observations from a “public vantage
point where they have a right to be.”263 Had the greenhouse contents
been viewable from the road, the officer would have been permitted to
make such observations and so likewise, the officer was permitted to
make such observations from navigable airspace where he had a legal
right to be.264
Third, the Supreme Court emphasized that the flight of both private and commercial helicopters is routine across the country and
equally the use of helicopters by police is pervasive.265 The defendant
then cannot reasonably believe that his greenhouse would be protected
from such observations.266 The Court noted that the outcome might be
different had the helicopter been flying at an altitude prohibited by law
or regulation.267 Finally, there were no intimate activities revealed, nor
was there any undue noise, wind, dust, or injury inflicted upon the defendant during the operation of the helicopter. 268 While it was not of
any importance that the surveillance had occurred within the curtilage
of the defendant’s home, the Court stated that not all aerial observation
of curtilage will be protected.269
Both Justice Powell’s dissent in Ciraolo and Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Riley questioned the majority’s holding that the defendants exposed their private activities to aerial observations by law
enforcement.270 Justice Powell emphasized that the police observations
invaded the defendant’s curtilage and as such, the manner by which the

263. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 450-51 (noting that police in every state currently employ the use of helicopters and more than 10,000 private and public helicopters were registered in the United
States at the time).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 451.
268. Id.
269. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan distinguished the holding in Ciraolo by stating that the altitude of 1,000 feet at
which the surveillance occurred in Ciraolo was an altitude in which was common for
commercial flight as to be compared to a public thoroughfare. Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the vantage point of the officer in the helicopter was
not one in which any citizen could easily engage in. Id. Further, the surveillance here
used expensive and sophisticated equipment that most citizens would not have access to.
Id. In accord with Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, Justice Brennan questioned the majority’s reliance on FAA regulations for determining that the officer was at a permitted vantage point and emphasized that FAA regulations prohibit fixed-wing aircraft below 500
feet whereas helicopters are permitted below that level. Id. at 458-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Such a decision leaves an individual’s expectation of privacy reliant on whether
the aerial surveillance was made from a helicopter or a fixed-wing plane. Id. at 451.
270. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 216 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); Riley, 488
U.S. at 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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observations occurred should not be material.271 Justice Powell also discounted that the defendant knowingly exposed the activities in his
backyard to the general public in navigable airspace because there is a
“qualitative difference” in the observations made by ordinary airplane
passengers and law enforcement.272 While ordinary airplane passengers
might look out the window, they are not searching an individual’s backyard for evidence of crimes such as law enforcement officers are. 273 Finally, Justice Powell questioned the measures an individual would need
to take to adequately protect the activities in areas surrounding the
home.274
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Riley questioned the majority’s
reliance on FAA regulations in determining whether the aerial surveillance violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy under
the Fourth Amendment.275 Justice O’Conner stated that the FAA determines whether particular aircraft can fly at certain altitudes for
safety purposes and not in consideration of an individual’s privacy.276
Therefore, society’s reasonable expectation of privacy in regards to aircraft altitude will not be the same as the FAA’s. 277 Justice O’Connor argued that the inquiry post-Ciroalo should be whether or not the aircraft
is at an altitude at which the public travels regularly and not whether
the aircraft is at an altitude permitted by FAA regulations.278 Therefore, if the public regularly travels at such an altitude, the defendant

271. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the use of a “product of modern technology,” the airplane, invaded the defendant’s curtilage and the Katz
test protects against such a technical trespass).
272. Id. at 224.
273. Id. at 225.
274. Id. at 224. Justice Powell noted that “few build roofs over their backyards,” and
the failure to build such adequate barriers should not equate the notion that individuals
knowingly expose their activities. Id.
275. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-54 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan’s dissent echoed Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in this aspect. Justice Brennan
distinguished the holding in Ciraolo stating that the altitude of 1,000 feet at which the
surveillance occurred in Ciraolo was an altitude in which was common for commercial
flight as to be compared to a public thoroughfare. Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The vantage point of the officer in the helicopter was not one in which any citizen could
easily engage in. Id. Further, the surveillance here used the expensive and sophisticated
equipment that most citizens would not have access to. Id. In accord with Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence, Justice Brennan questioned the majority’s reliance on FAA regulations for determining that the officer was at a permitted vantage point and emphasized
that FAA regulations prohibit fixed-wing aircraft below 500 feet whereas helicopters are
permitted below that level. Id.at 458-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent argued
such a decision leaves an individual’s expectation of privacy reliant on whether the aerial
surveillance was made from a helicopter or a fixed-wing plane. Id. at 451, 454-55
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 450-54 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
277. Id.
278. Id.
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cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy from such an altitude
and should be considered to have knowingly exposed his activities to
the public.279 In accord with Justice Powell’s Ciroalo dissent, Justice
O’Connor questioned the majority’s comparison between police observations of curtilage from the ground-level to police observations of curtilage from navigable airspace.280 An individual may take effective protective measures to obscure observations from public roads or sidewalks
such as erecting tall fences, but individuals cannot obscure all conceivable views of their backyards from aerial observation without rendering
such areas useless.281
In Dow Chemical Company, the Supreme Court held that government aerial observations of an industrial complex did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 282 The EPA hired a commercial photographer to
take photographs of the Dow complex.283 Using an airplane equipped
with professional mapping cameras, photographs were taken of several
buildings, equipment, and piping that was exposed to aerial observation.284 These photographs were taken at altitudes between 1,000 feet
and 12,000 feet.285 The Court denied that Dow had any reasonable expectation of privacy against aerial observations of the complex.286 First,
the airplane was within legal navigable airspace. 287 Second, the industrial complex was not curtilage but instead fell under the open fields
doctrine.288 The Court stated that “any person with an airplane and
aerial camera”289 could take similar photographs; therefore, Dow could
not reasonably expect privacy in the exposed components of its facility.290
Justice Powell dissented, questioning the majority’s view that Dow
had not taken adequate measures to manifest a reasonable expectation
of privacy against aerial surveillance of the complex.291 Justice Powell
argued that “short of erecting a roof” over the entire complex, Dow had
several security measures292 in place to adequately protect against
279. See id. at 454-55 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
280. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452-54 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
281. Id. at 450-54 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
282. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 232.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 239.
287. Id.
288. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
289. Id. at 231.
290. Id. at 239.
291. Id. at 240-41 (Powell, J., dissenting).
292. Id. Dow took several measures including surrounding the complex with an
eight foot chain link fence, security guards, surveillance cameras monitored by closedcircuit T.V., motion detectors, and a security guard post at the front gate. In terms of aerial observations, Dow informed its employees to report to the company when planes other
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ground-level and aerial observations. Since Dow took more than adequate measures to protect against ground-level observations, aerial observations should likewise require a warrant.293
Collectively, these cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has
generally disregarded the subjective prong of the Katz test and focused
almost entirely on the objective prong in analyzing warrantless government aerial surveillance under the Fourth Amendment.
4. Nowhere to Hide: Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court has reviewed several different surveillance
devices that monitor and track the movements of a suspect and augment law enforcement’s natural observation capabilities.294 The Supreme Court’s analysis of various tracking devices will be particularly
indicative of the Court’s analysis of warrantless government drone use
as a drone’s tracking capabilities far exceed that of any device reviewed
by the Court to date.
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless installation and use of a pen register295 to record phone numbers
dialed from the suspect’s home phone was not a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 296 After being robbed, a woman gave police a description of the robber and a car that had been seen at the scene of the
crime.297 Shortly after the robbery, she began to receive threatening
and obscene phone calls from a man claiming to be the robber.298 Officers observed a car matching the description of the car from the robbery
driving around the victim’s neighborhood and traced the license plate to
the defendant.299 Officers requested that the phone company install a
pen register at the company’s offices in an effort to record the numbers
dialed from the defendant’s home phone.300 Through the pen register,
officers discovered that a phone call was made from the defendant’s
than commercial airliners were flying above the complex. Dow would then relay this information to the police. Id. at 241-42 (Powell, J., dissenting).
293. See id. at 250-51 (Powell, J., dissenting).
294. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 705 (1984) (beeper); see also Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979) (pen register); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 945 (2012) (GPS).
295. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735, fn. 1 (a pen register is a device that records on paper all
the phone numbers dialed on a specific phone).
296. Id. at 735.
297. Id. at 737.
298. Id. (describing that during one call the man told the woman to step outside onto
her porch and after doing so, she observed the same car she had reported at the scene of
the robbery drive past her house).
299. Id.
300. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979) (stating that the officers had discovered the defendant’s address from the license plate of the car that had been seen driving around the victim’s neighborhood).
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home to the victim’s phone.301 The defendant challenged the warrantless installation of the pen register as a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.302
The Supreme Court determined first that there was no physical intrusion upon the defendant since the pen register was installed on the
telephone company’s property with its permission. 303 Next, the Court
considered whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that the warrantless use of the pen register violated. 304 The scope
of information that a pen register can obtain is limited to the phone
numbers that are dialed.305 A pen register cannot listen in on or record
a phone conversation and is unable to identify the caller or recipient of
the dialed phone numbers.306 Under the first prong of the Katz test, the
Court denied that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in telephone numbers that are dialed.307 Phone users are aware that
their phone numbers will be conveyed to the phone company and that
the phone company has the ability to record such information.308 Under
the third party doctrine, an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to third parties.309 When a
phone user dials a phone number, he knowingly exposes the phone
number information to the phone company.310 Therefore, the Court held
that society is not prepared to recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in an individual’s telephone numbers.311
The Supreme Court next reviewed two cases challenging warrantless government surveillance aided by the use of a beeper.312 First, in
United States v. Knotts, the Court analyzed whether the warrantless
monitoring of the defendant’s movements by the use of a beeper violat-

301. Id. Based partly on the evidence from the pen register, officers obtained a search
warrant for the defendant’s home. Id. The search of his home revealed a phone book with
the victim’s name indicated and the defendant was arrested. Id. The victim subsequently
identified the defendant in a line-up as the man who robbed her. Id.
302. Id. at 737-38.
303. Id. at 741.
304. Id. at 742.
305. Id. at 741.
306. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
307. Id. at 742.
308. Id. at 742-43 (noting that phone users know they reveal their phone numbers to
the phone company because it is the phone company’s equipment that completes their
calls. Further, phone companies keep records of users’ phone numbers for purposes of billing for long distance calls and users receive these bills).
309. Id. at 743-44.
310. Id. at 744.
311. Id. at 743.
312. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983) (a beeper is a radio transmitting device that sends intermittent signals which are picked by a radio receiver); see also
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 705 (1984).
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ed his Fourth Amendment rights. 313 Officers placed a beeper inside a
container of chloroform purchased by one of the defendants.314 The container was placed inside the defendant’s car and officers monitored his
movements with the beeper signals and visual surveillance.315 During
the surveillance officers lost both visual contact and the beeper signal
but were able to pick up the beeper signal with the aid of a law enforcement helicopter in the area.316 The officers then monitored the signal to the defendant’s cabin.317 Based on the information discovered
from the beeper and three days of visual surveillance, officers obtained
a search warrant for the defendant’s house.318 The Court held that the
beeper surveillance was equivalent to the officers following a vehicle on
public streets and an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements along public streets.319 When the defendants chose
to travel along public roadways, they voluntarily conveyed their movements and destinations to the public, effectively removing any claim to
a reasonable expectation of privacy.320
The defendants argued that the officers had impermissibly gained
knowledge of the location of the cabin through the monitoring of beeper
signals after they had lost visual contact with the vehicle.321 The Court
stated that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit law enforcement
from using sense-augmenting devices in a situation where the information obtained by officers could have been equally obtained by visual
surveillance.322 Although the Court recognized that the officers lost
visual contact with the vehicle and therefore could not have located the
cabin without the beeper signals, the Court noted that had police not
lost visual contact the location of the cabin would still have been discoverable through visual observation.323 The scope of the beeper signals

313. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
314. Id. at 277-78 (stating that officers obtained consent to install the beeper inside
the chloroform container from the company where defendant Armstrong purchased the
chloroform).
315. Id. at 277.
316. Id. at 278-79.
317. Id. at 279.
318. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
319. Id. at 281 (emphasizing that individuals enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy in
their cars since the car’s primary function is transportation and does not host intimate
activities as does the home).
320. Id. at 281-82 (reaffirming that Knotts had an expectation of privacy while inside
his cabin but not with respect to the governmental surveillance of automobiles arriving at
the cabin and leaving the cabin, or the movement of certain objects (i.e. the container of
chloroform outside the cabin in the open fields)).
321. Id. at 282.
322. Id. at 282-83.
323. Id. at 284-85 (emphasizing that once officers had discovered the location of the
cabin they no longer relied on the beeper signals for any information).
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was limited and officers discovered no information they could not have
ascertained through visual surveillance.324
The following year in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court
considered whether the warrantless monitoring of a beeper by law enforcement that reveals information which could not have been obtained
through visual observation violates the Fourth Amendment. 325 The defendant and two other men ordered fifty gallons of ether from a photography company in Albuquerque, New Mexico and the company subsequently contacted police.326 The officers obtained a search warrant
authorizing the installation and monitoring of a beeper in one of the
cans of ether and with the consent of the photography company the officers switched one of the company’s cans of ether for a law enforcement
can holding a beeper inside.327 Officers visually observed the defendant
picking up the ether from the company and proceeded to follow him
both visually and with the aid of the beeper.328 The surveillance lasted
several days and through monitoring the beeper, officers followed the
can of ether while it was moved four times and eventually arrived at a
storage facility.329 Officers observed the smell of ether from a locker in
the storage facility and with the facility’s permission installed a closedcircuit video camera inside the locker.330 The video surveillance of the
locker showed two men removing the ether and loading it into a truck
owned by Horton, an associate of the defendant’s.331 Through both visual surveillance and monitoring the beeper, the officers tracked Horton’s
truck to a residence in Taos, New Mexico.332 After the truck left the res-

324. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983).
325. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 705 (1984) (considering whether the installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals delivered to a buyer with knowledge of the
presence of the beeper constitutes a search or seizure).
326. Id. at 708. Ether can be used to extract cocaine from clothing that has been imported into the United States and so the large quantity that Karo purchased aroused police suspicions. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. The monitored can of ether was followed to two different storage facilities.
Id. The beeper was not technologically advanced enough to locate the precise locker in the
storage facility where the ether was. Id. Officers obtained a subpoena for the facility’s records and found that a locker had been rented by Horton, an associate of Karo. Id. Officers
verified that the can was in Horton’s locker by narrowing down the origin of the beeper
signals to the row containing Horton’s locker. Id. The officers then smelled the ether emanating from Horter’s locker and obtained an order allowing them to install a door alarm
on the locker, which would alert police when the locker was opened. Id. at 709. Horton
managed to open the locker and remove the can without setting off the door alarm. Id.
The officers then continued to track the beeper and followed the trail to another storage
facility three days later. Id.
330. Id.
331. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 709 (1984).
332. Id. The first stop from the storage facility was to the residence of another associate of Horton and Karo, Rhodes. Id. Through visually observing Rhodes’ residence, offic-
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idence, the officers used the beeper to discover that the ether was still
inside the residence and had not been moved again in the truck.333 A
search warrant for the residence was then obtained based in part on
the information discovered from monitoring the beeper.334
The Court first determined that the installation of the beeper itself
in the can of ether did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights.335 The Court then considered whether the officers violated the
Fourth Amendment by monitoring the beeper while it was inside the
Taos residence.336 The Court held that the warrantless use of an electronic device by law enforcement to obtain information that cannot be
gathered from observation outside the home is an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment just as if one of the officers had entered
the residence without a warrant to confirm the presence of the ether. 337
Although monitoring an electronic device such as a beeper is less intrusive than a physical search, the device still reveals important facts
about activities regarding the interior of an individual’s home that the
government cannot obtain without a warrant.338 The officers had the
ability to discover the Taos residence solely using visual surveillance
but they relied on the beeper to verify that the ether was still located
inside the residence.339 The Court distinguished this case from Knotts
by noting that the beeper in Knotts did not convey any information regarding activities inside Knotts’ cabin and was limited to information
that any member of the public could have observed. 340 The beeper monitoring of the Taos residence indicated that the ether was inside the
residence, information that was not subject to general visual observation.341

ers were able to determine that the ether was being moved again. Id. Employing both visual and beeper surveillance the officers tracked the ether to the residence in Taos. Id.
333. Id. at 709-10.
334. Id. at 710. Officers had also observed that the windows of the residence were
open on a cold, windy day and believed that the ether was being used inside. Id. Karo was
subsequently indicted for conspiracy to possess cocaine. Id.
335. Id. at 711 (holding that Karo had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the can
of ether since the ether belonged to the photography company who consented to the government invasion of the ether. Id. Additionally, the substituted can belonged to the Drug
Enforcement Agency and Karo would have no claim of privacy in the can. Id. The transfer
of the can containing the beeper to Karo created no violation because it did not convey any
information that Karo could expect to keep private. Id. at 712.
336. Id. at 714.
337. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 715-18.
340. Id.
341. Id. Similarly, the Court held that since the beeper only revealed that the ether
was in one of the lockers within the storage facility the search of first locker did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 719-20. The beeper did not reveal the contents of the
locker and the police officers used their sense of smell to locate the specific locker with the
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The most recent examination of a tracking device was in United
States v. Jones where the Supreme Court held that the warrantless installment and use of a GPS device constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment.342 Officers suspected the defendant of drug trafficking and obtained a warrant for the installation of a GPS device on
the defendant’s vehicle.343 The warrant required that the GPS installation occur within ten days in the District of Columbia.344 Officers failed
to comply with the warrant by installing the GPS on the defendant’s
vehicle in Maryland eleven days later.345 The GPS monitoring resulted
in over 2,000 pages of data regarding the defendant’s movements over
twenty-eight days.346 The defendant filed a motion to suppress the GPS
evidence alleging that it was the fruit of an illegal search under the
Fourth Amendment.347 Since the officers failed to comply with the
search warrant requirements, the search warrant was rendered invalid
and the installment and use of the GPS was a warrantless action. 348
The issue then became whether the warrantless GPS tracking of the defendant’s movements constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.349
While the Court found the attachment of the GPS to require a
warrant, the focus was not on the Katz test of privacy expectations. 350
Instead, the Court placed emphasis on the physical intrusion of the defendant’s property – the car – by the installation of the GPS.351 The
Court dismissed the government’s argument that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the bottom of Jones’s car and found that
the physical attachment of the GPS rendered an analysis under the

ether. Id. at 720. If the beeper had disclosed the contents of the locker, Horton’s expectation of privacy would have been violated. Id. at 721.
342. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. (using satellites, the GPS relayed the vehicle’s location within fifty to 100
feet to a law enforcement cell phone and subsequently to a government computer).
347. Id. The defendant was indicted on multiple drug charges including conspiracy to
distribute and possess cocaine. The District Court partially granted the defendant’s motion and suppressed the GPS data gathered while the defendant’s car was parked in a
garage attached to his residence. Id. at 948. The District Court allowed the remaining
GPS data because it was obtained while the defendant was traveling on public roads and
he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in this information. Id. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and found the warrantless use of
the GPS to violate the Fourth Amendment. Id.
348. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012) (stating that noncompliance
with a warrant generally renders the warrant useless; therefore, any subsequent actions
are made without a valid search warrant. The government conceded that the officers had
not complied with the search warrant here).
349. Id. at 948.
350. Id.
351. Id.
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Katz test unnecessary.352 Where there is a physical intrusion by law enforcement on a constitutionally protected area, a search under the
Fourth Amendment has occurred. 353 When the officers installed the
GPS device on the defendant’s vehicle in violation of the search warrant
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were subsequently infringed
upon.354
The Court rejected the government’s comparison of the GPS information gathered to information gathered by beepers in Karo and
Knotts.355 The government argued that the defendant’s movements that
were tracked by the GPS were mostly on public roads comparable to the
movements tracked in Knotts.356 The Court did not discuss whether the
defendant’s movements along public roads were subject to Fourth
Amendment protection but focused on the installation components of
the beeper in Knotts and Karo.357 In both Knotts and Karo, the beeper
was placed in containers before the defendants took possession of the
containers whereas the GPS device was installed on the defendant’s
vehicle while the defendant was in possession of the vehicle.358 The
Court acknowledged that had the GPS device not physically intruded
upon the defendant’s protected property, the Fourth Amendment analysis would be conducted under the Katz test.359 The question of whether
long-term monitoring of a defendant’s movements along public roads
without a physical trespass constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment was reserved.360
Both Justice Sotomayor’s and Justice Alito’s concurrences raised
concerns about future invasive governmental surveillance that does not
require any physical trespass upon an individual.361 Justice Sotomayor
agreed that the warrantless installation of the GPS device had
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment due to a physical intrusion upon the defendant’s property.362 Justice Sotomayor emphasized, however, that many devices are capable of GPS-like monitoring
without requiring a physical installation, such as smartphones with

352. Id. at 950.
353. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 952.
356. Id.
357. Id. The government also argued that the defendants’ activities were subject to
the open fields doctrine and therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. The
Court similarly dismissed this argument and focused on the physical intrusion upon the
defendant’s vehicle. Id. at 953.
358. Id. at 952.
359. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 953-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 957-64 (Alito, J., concurring).
362. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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GPS capabilities.363 With such technology, the majority’s trespass analysis would be inapplicable.364 Justice Sotomayor expressed concern over
the capability of the Katz test to protect the privacy interests that GPS
tracking can infringe upon.365 Even though GPS surveillance only relays an individual’s movements along public roads, this information can
lead to the discovery of intimate and private information concerning
that individual.366 In comparison to other surveillance methods, GPS
tracking information can be recorded for long periods of time, is cheaper
and more efficient, and can be accomplished without an individual being alerted.367 Justice Sotomayor noted that awareness that the government has the ability to track such personal information could chill
expression and the capabilities of GPS technology should be taken into
account when considering whether society has a reasonable expectation
of privacy from such surveillance under the Katz test.368
Justice Sotomayor also argued that the third party doctrine might
need to be reconsidered in recognition of the highly digitalized aspects
of daily life.369 With most business transactions now taking place
online, individuals are inevitably submitting private information such
as phone numbers, website visits, e-mail address, and sensitive product
information.370 Justice Sotomayor expressed concerns over whether
such private information would be protected from the warrantless
gathering of such information because with the exposure of such information to third parties, Fourth Amendment protection ceases.371
Justice Alito agreed that the warrantless, long-term monitoring of
a defendant’s movements by the use of a GPS device constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment.372 However, Justice Alito argued
that the proper analysis was under a reasonable expectation of privacy
inquiry and not under a physical trespass inquiry.373 Justice Alito dis-

363. Id.
364. Id.
365. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
366. Id. (noting that through the observation of an individual’s movements, private
details such as an individual’s religious beliefs, appointments with a psychiatrist, political
meetings or associations, and other such revealing personal information can be discovered).
367. Id.
368. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
369. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The third party doctrine under the
Fourth Amendment provides no protection to information or activities knowingly exposed
to third parties or the general public. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
370. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(stating that for example, individuals expose information regarding books and medication
that they purchase over the internet).
371. Id. at 956-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
372. Id. at 957-58 (Alito, J., concurring).
373. Id.
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missed that there was any interference with the defendant’s property
interests in the vehicle because if there was interference with the operation of the defendant’s vehicle, the defendant would have been made
aware of the installment of the GPS.374 Additionally, Justice Alito argued that previous cases had established that an individual’s property
right was only one factor in determining whether legitimate privacy interests exist.375 Therefore, any physical trespass upon the defendant
from the GPS device should only be one factor in considering whether
the GPS installation and monitoring violated the defendant’s expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.376
Similar to Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, Justice Alito argued
that the majority’s approach is insufficient protection against warrantless government surveillance involving technologically advanced devices, which require no physical intrusion.377 Justice Alito emphasized
that the most invasive aspect of the GPS device is not any physical interference with the vehicle, but the fact that the GPS could monitor an
individual for long periods of time.378 However, Justice Alito concedes
that even an analysis under the Katz test does not provide adequate
protection in light of advancing technology.379 With the pervasive use of
smartphones with GPS abilities or the increasing use of tracking programs in vehicles, what an individual can expect to be private diminishes.380 Justice Alito also noted that previously due to costs and difficulty, law enforcement could not practically observe and collect the
amount of information that new devices such as a GPS now permit. 381
Justice Alito concluded by suggesting that legislation might provide the
greatest protection and would be in a better situation to gauge society’s
changing perceptions.382
While a beeper has a limited range of information that it can convey, the Court drew a distinction as to where this information can be
374. Id. Justice Alito noted that being able to install and monitor the defendant’s
movements with a GPS without altering the defendant to the presence of the device is
part of what makes this device successful. Id.
375. Id. at 957-60 (Alito, J., concurring).
376. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957-58 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
377. Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito questions whether the outcome of
the case had been different if law enforcement, without a warrant, monitored the defendant’s movements through the use a stolen vehicle detection program already installed in
the car. Such a use would require no physical installation or intrusion upon the defendant. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
380. Id. Justice Alito noted that smartphones with GPS tracking provide the phone
user’s location and movements to the phone provider. Additionally, social tools on phones
allow users to find other users. Id. Highway tolls can also provide precise records of an
individual’s movements. Id.
381. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
382. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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obtained. Law enforcement may monitor an individual’s movements
conveyed in public areas without a warrant, but a warrant is required
to monitor any beeper information relating to the interior of an individual’s home.383 When analyzing the more advanced GPS device, the
Court did not consider the content of the information gathered but rather focused on the installation of the device.384
5. Law Enforcement’s Best Friend: Dog Sniffs and Other Non-Electronic
Sense Augmentation
The Supreme Court has considered various surveillance methods
that have not employed electronic devices but still provide senseaugmenting aid to law enforcement.385 Without the presence of an electronic surveillance device, the Court places a greater emphasis on the
scope of the information gathered and the level of sense augmentation
that the method of surveillance entails.386 A search that is initially reasonable can become an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment through an overly broad scope and an impermissible level of intensity.387
In United States v. Place, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless dog sniff conducted by a well-trained narcotics dog does not violate
the Fourth Amendment. 388 The Court emphasized that although the
dog sniff discloses information about the contents of sealed luggage, a
dog sniff conducted by a narcotics dog is limited in scope.389 The dog
sniff exposes only contraband items as opposed to the exposure of personal items that would occur if an officer opened the bag and searched
through it.390 This limited exposure does not subject an individual to
the same embarrassment or inconvenience of more physically intrusive
methods.391 Justice Brennan argued in his concurrence that use of the

383. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 708, 715-18 (1984).
384. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
385. See generally United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 696 (1983) (warrantless dog
sniff of luggage); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 417 (2005) (warrantless dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (warrantless
search of defendant’s garbage).
386. Place, 462 U.S. at 696 (discussing that a dog sniff is limited to revealing contraband items); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 334 (2000) (holding that a tactile observation of luggage impermissible due to intensive scope).
387. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
388. Place, 462 U.S. at 696.
389. Id. at 707.
390. Id. (stating that an individual has no protectable interest in contraband items
such as weapons).
391. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (calling the method of using a
dog sniff “sui generis” in that no other investigative procedure is as limited in the scope
and manner of the information obtained).
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narcotics dog constituted sense augmentation.392 Dog sniffs reveal information that officers could not obtain through the use of their own
senses.393 Justice Brennan argued that dog sniffs present an intrusion
upon an individual similar to an intrusion by an electronic device.394
In Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme Court expanded the application of Place and held that a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic
stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment when the dog sniff only
reveals the location of a contraband item.395 In Caballes, the defendant
was stopped for speeding on an interstate highway and the state police
drug unit arrived at the scene with a narcotics dog.396 The officer
walked the narcotics dog around the defendant’s car and the dog alerted the officer to the trunk of the car.397 Based on the dog’s alert, the officers searched the trunk and discovered drugs.398 The Court again emphasized that a dog sniff is limited in scope by discovering only
contraband items to which an individual has no legitimate interest in
possessing.399 Therefore, the Court extended Place to lawful traffic
stops and held that the use of a well-trained narcotics dog to expose only contraband items does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.400
Justice Souter’s dissent questioned both the majority holding and
the previous Place decision that dog sniffs are not searches.401 Justice
Souter categorized the dog sniff as sense augmentation, giving officers
information about the contents of a private area that human senses
could not similarly obtain.402 Additionally, Justice Souter argued that
the scope of information discovered by a dog sniff is not always limited
to contraband items.403 There can be errors in dog sniffs and, as such,
the dog sniff might disclose intimate details about an individual without revealing any contraband items.404 Justice Souter compared the use
of a dog sniff to the thermal imaging device in Kyllo.405 While the thermal imaging device reveals intimate details of the home, a flawed dog

392. Id. at 719-20 (Brennan, J., concurring).
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 417 (2005).
396. Id. at 406.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 408.
400. Id. at 409.
401. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting).
403. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 719-20 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
404. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing to the possibility of dog
handler errors and the natural limitations of the dogs themselves).
405. Id. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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sniff will reveal intimate, private contents of an individual’s luggage or
vehicle.406
In California v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless search and seizure of garbage bags left on the defendant’s curb
for trash collection is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 407 Officers received a tip that the defendant was selling narcotics out of his
home and asked the neighborhood’s regular garbage collector to give police the defendant’s garbage bags.408 Officers then searched the defendant’s garbage in the bags and discovered evidence indicative of narcotics use.409 The Court held that the defendant knowingly exposed his
garbage to the trash collector and therefore could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of his garbage bags.410 By placing
his garbage on the curb in front of his home, the defendant exposed his
garbage to the public and officers are not required to turn away from
evidence of criminal activity that could be observed by members of the
general public.411
Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that the defendant exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy.412 The defendant placed his garbage in sealed opaque bags instead of clear plastic bags in an attempt
to conceal the contents of the garbage bags.413 Additionally, Justice
Brennan argued that society is prepared to recognize a legitimate privacy interest in the contents of an individual’s garbage.414 An individual’s garbage can contain revealing information about financial, recreational, health, political, and other intimate details of an individual’s
life.415 Therefore, most members of society expect a level of privacy in
their trash from warrantless government intrusions.416 Finally, Justice
Brennan argued that the defendant had no other option but to leave his
trash out on the curb for the garbage collector and therefore did not
knowingly expose his garbage.417

406. Id.
407. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
408. Id. (police instructed the trash collector to isolate the defendant’s garbage so
other neighborhood residents’ garbage was not mixed up with the defendant’s garbage).
409. Id. at 38.
410. Id. at 39.
411. Id. (stating that the garbage was subject to animals, children, scavengers, and
other members of the public who wish to open the bags and search through the defendant’s trash).
412. Id. at 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
413. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 46 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id. (arguing that the contents of an individual’s garbage contain information relating to the intimacies of private life which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect).
417. Id. (discussing that the defendant could not simply leave the trash inside his
home and was required by a city ordinance to leave his trash at his curb).
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In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer’s tactile observation 418 of a bus passenger’s luggage
violated the Fourth Amendment. 419 The defendant was a passenger on
a Greyhound bus headed to Arkansas.420 The bus stopped at a checkpoint in Texas where a border patrol agent entered the bus to verify the
immigration status of the passengers.421 After verifying the immigration status of the bus passengers, the border patrol agent then proceeded to squeeze the passengers’ luggage placed in the overhead storage
compartments.422 When the agent squeezed the defendant’s canvas bag,
the agent felt a “brick-like” object and asked the defendant’s permission
to open the bag.423 The defendant permitted the agent to open the bag
and discovered methamphetamine.424 The defendant moved to suppress
the evidence, arguing that the agent had illegally searched his bag.425
The government argued that the defendant knowingly exposed his bag
when he placed it in the overhead compartment and could not have any
reasonable expectation that his bag would not be physically manipulated.426 The Court dismissed this argument and conceded that, while
travelers expect some form of touching and handling of luggage during
the course of travel, the agent’s physical manipulation of the defendant’s bag exceeded this expectation.427 Although the agent did not conduct an invasive search upon the defendant’s person, the agent engaged
in a “probing tactile examination” of his luggage, which individuals typically use to carry personal items.428 Under the Katz test, the defendant
manifested an expectation of privacy in the contents of his bag by using
a green, opaque bag and putting the bag in the overhead compartment
directly above his bus seat.429 This subjective expectation of privacy is
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable since bus
passengers expect other passengers to bump or move their luggage as
an incident of travel but do not expect other passengers or bus employees to squeeze their bags in an exploratory manner as the agent did.430
418. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000) (categorizing the agent’s physical manipulation of the defendant’s bag as tactile observation and cites a “stop and frisk”
as another example of tactile observation).
419. Id. at 335.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 336.
424. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336 (2000) (the government did not argue
that the defendant’s consent validated the search or should have been a basis for admitting the evidence).
425. Id.
426. Id. at 337.
427. Id. at 338-39.
428. Id. at 337-38.
429. Id. at 338.
430. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000).
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From a spike mike431 to a GPS432, the Supreme Court has reviewed
the use of a wide array of government investigative tools under the
Fourth Amendment. 433 The key inquiry in these cases is whether or not
law enforcement must first obtain a warrant before using these devices
to gain information about an individual.434 The outcomes have differed
based on several common principles.435 This Comment will now look at
these principles as applied to the governmental use of drones, ultimately determining if and when law enforcement must obtain a warrant.
ANALYSIS
PART III: GOVERNMENTAL DRONE USE V. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”436 If government activity is deemed a “search”
under the Fourth Amendment, then that activity requires the use of a
warrant.437 Analysis under the Fourth Amendment began solely as a
determination focused on the presence of a physical trespass upon the
individual by law enforcement and has evolved into serving as the privacy safeguard of the Constitution.438 The Supreme Court has faced
several Fourth Amendment challenges to the warrantless use of several
government-employed surveillance tools.439 When faced with these challenges, the Court must come to a determination that adequately pro-

431. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961) (a spike mike is a microphone with a foot long spike attached and allows listening through the use of headphones).
432. See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
433. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (pen register); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (beeper); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35
(1988) (search of defendant’s garbage); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (dog sniff);
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (thermal imaging device).
434. See generally Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35; Bond, 529 U.S. at 334; Knotts, 460
U.S. at 276 (challenges to warrantless searches).
435. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989) (knowingly exposed activities); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986) (knowingly exposed activities); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979) (third-party doctrine); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57,
59 (1924) (open fields doctrine).
436. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
437. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004).
438. Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 438 (1928) (actual physical
invasion of the person or property required for a Fourth Amendment violation) with Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not
places”).
439. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735 (pen register); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276 (beeper); Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35 (search of defendant’s garbage); Caballes, 543 U.S. at 405 (dog sniff);
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27 (thermal imaging device).
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tects individuals’ privacy while not unnecessarily removing a vital investigative tool from law enforcement.
Despite the wide range of differences in the type of information obtained and the technology possessed, the Court has developed several
principles when analyzing government surveillance. Part Three of this
Comment will discuss these common principles applied to government
surveillance as reviewed by the Court and how these principles will be
applied to warrantless governmental drone surveillance under the
Fourth Amendment.
A. The Legal Standard Applicable to Drone Surveillance
The first determination in Fourth Amendment analysis of governmental drone surveillance is which standard the Supreme Court should
apply. Early challenges to electronic surveillance under the Fourth
Amendment focused exclusively on the element of physical intrusion into a protected area.440 Therefore, warrantless wiretaps attached to
phone wires on a public street did not constitute a search 441 while a
spike mike442 inserted into a defendant’s heating duct violated the
Fourth Amendment.443 The Court shifted away from this physical trespass focus in Katz. The two-part Katz test asks whether an individual
exhibited a subjective, reasonable expectation of privacy that society
was objectively prepared to accept as reasonable.444
However, the Court’s most recent decision on governmental surveillance focused once again on the physical trespass aspect despite involving an electronic surveillance device.445 Contrary to previous electronic surveillance search challenges, the Court in Jones began its
analysis with the physical intrusion inquiry instead of the two-part
Katz test.446 The Jones court determined that the warrantless attachment of a GPS device on the suspect’s vehicle was an occupation of the
suspect’s private property for the purpose of obtaining information. 447
This unlawful physical intrusion constituted an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment.448 The Court stopped its analysis there
and did not consider whether, under the Katz test, the defendant had a
440. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438 (actual physical invasion of the person or property
required for a Fourth Amendment violation); accord Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 512 (1961).
441. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438.
442. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 505 (a spike mike is a microphone with a foot long spike
attached and allows listening through the use of headphones).
443. Id.
444. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
445. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012).
446. Id. at 949.
447. Id. at 948-50.
448. Id.
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reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicular movements along
public roads.449
Drones possess the ability to quickly be deployed without having to
physically attach a device onto a suspect’s property.450 Therefore, analysis of drone surveillance would be under the two-part Katz test, asking
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is willing to protect. 451 The case law concerning government surveillance analyzed under the Katz test presents several general principles that will be applicable to governmental drone use. These principles
are broken into general two categories: location and information.
B. Drones Everywhere? Drones v. Open Fields, Curtilage, and the FAA
A key component in Fourth Amendment challenges to government
observation is determining the type of area where the observation occurred. As with previous devices, drone use that occurs within a protected area will require a warrant.452 Despite the importance of this
designation, the analysis has not been distinct or uniform.453
1. Drones and the Open Fields Doctrine
Applying the express language of the Fourth Amendment, protection to the people in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” the
Supreme Court has held that this protection does not extend to the
open fields.454 The open fields doctrine stands for the idea that an
individual cannot reasonably expect privacy protection for activities
conducted outside the home in open fields.455 The open fields doctrine
protects warrantless police observations conducted in an open fields area as if the observations were made in a public place.456 The open fields

449. Id. at 952-57 (it was the government’s argument that the defendant did not
have any reasonable expectation of privacy in both the under body of the vehicle where
the GPS was attached and in the information revealed by the GPS of the defendant’s
movements along public streets).
450. For example, the Honeywell T-Hawk Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) is able to be carried in a backpack and immediately deployed at any time, in area type of location. Glenn
W. Goodman, Jr., UAVs Hover and Stare, DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL (July/August 2006).
451. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
452. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001) (holding that warrantless use of
thermal imaging device aimed at the home violates the Fourth Amendment); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 170 (1984) (holding that warrantless search of defendant’s
fields permitted under the open fields doctrine).
453. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 175 (commenting on the confusion that the open fields doctrine has created in both state and federal courts).
454. Id.
455. Id. at 176.
456. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 303 (1986).
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doctrine has been used to validate warrantless observations of businesses457 and movements along public streets.458
The Court has consistently held that an individual has the highest
level of protection under the Fourth Amendment in his home.459 In
Kyllo, the Court affirmed the strong protection that the Fourth
Amendment affords an individual’s home.460 Acting on a tip that defendant was growing marijuana in his house, officers obtained a thermal imaging device and pointed it at the defendant’s home. 461 The
Court held that using a “sense-enhancing device” that is not available
to the general public to obtain intimate details of an individual’s home
constitutes a presumptively unreasonable search. 462 The Court emphasized that any physical intrusion into the home even by a “fraction of an
inch” constitutes an unreasonable search.463 It was immaterial that the
thermal imaging device only showed the level of heat radiating from the
defendant’s home because when activities inside the home are at issue,
the quality or quantity of information obtained is immaterial.464
Warrantless use of drones to obtain information about activities
occurring within an individual’s home will be presumptively unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 465
Drones employ infrared technology, coupled with high-resolution camera technology and live video feeds, and the infrared information far exceeds that of the thermal imaging device in Kyllo.466 There is no doubt
that a drone can provide invasive and detailed information about the
intimate activities occurring within an individual’s home. 467 The Court
in Kyllo noted that the thermal imaging device was “not available to the
general public.”468 Drones are currently available to the general public
457. Id. at 227 (holding that aerial surveillance of the Dow Chemical complex is not a
search as businesses generally do not enjoy the same level of privacy expectation as individuals).
458. Knotts v. United States, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983) (surveillance of an automobile
along public streets and highways give no reasonable expectation of privacy).
459. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
460. Id. at 27.
461. Id. at 30 (officers hoped to detect a higher radiation of heat due to lamps needed
to grow marijuana).
462. Id. at 37.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (holding that a warrantless
search of an individual’s home is presumptively unreasonable).
466. Contra id. at 29-30 (a thermal imaging device detects radiation that objects or
people emit and relays this information into images based on differing colors. The color
black shows little to no warmth while white denotes hot areas); see Qube Overview, supra
note 64 (drones such as the Qube employ a computer tablet to transmit live video of the
images from a high-resolution color camera and a thermal camera).
467. Small drones such as AeroVironment’s Qube are equipped with a highresolution color camera and a thermal camera. Qube Overview, supra note 64.
468. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
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to purchase469 and with the integration of drones into national airspace
they will become more available and commonly used. However, the key
component in Kyllo was not the availability of the device but rather
that information about the activities of the defendant’s home was obtained.470 Even though public and private drone use will become prevalent, an individual still has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
activities occurring within his home.
The advanced technology of drones will require law enforcement to
obtain a warrant when used in commercial areas or open fields containing buildings. The Court in Dow Chemical Co. held that the outside areas of Dow’s commercial complex fell under the open fields doctrine and
did not constitute curtilage for aerial surveillance purposes.471 This was
in part because the photographs of the outside of the buildings and
equipment are not the intimate activities that the Fourth Amendment
protects.472 However, the Court noted that had the surveillance equipment been able to penetrate walls or listen in on conversations, the aerial surveillance of Dow’s complex might have required the use of a warrant.473 If a drone carrying infrared cameras or audio and video
recorders conducted the same aerial surveillance over the Dow complex
it would change the dynamic of the information obtained.474 Just as the
device in Kyllo did, a drone with infrared technology could monitor individuals’ movements inside the enclosed buildings in the Dow complex.475 Such surveillance would violate Dow’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment.476
The case law involving the open fields doctrine illustrates how
closely the line between the protected curtilage area and the unprotected open fields area can be. For example, in Dunn, officers crossed several fences to reach the defendant’s barn and once standing under the
barn’s overhang, they used a flashlight to discover the inner contents of
the barn.477 The defendant challenged the discovery of evidence inside

469. The Parrot AR. Drone can be purchased on Amazon.com for $299.00. Parrot AR
Drone 2.0, supra note 49.
470. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
471. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
472. Id.
473. The Court stated that Dow had a legitimate expectation of privacy within the
interior of the enclosed buildings that society is prepared to protect. Id. at 238-39.
474. Draganfly’s DraganFlyer X4 possesses thermal infrared cameras and an
onboard DVR. DraganFlyer X4 Features, supra note 51.
475. The thermal imaging device in Kyllo detected radiation that objects or people
emit and relayed this information into images based on differing colors. Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
476. The Court stated that Dow had a legitimate expectation of privacy within the
interior of the enclosed buildings that society is prepared to protect. Dow Chem. Co., 476
U.S. at 236.
477. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 297 (1987).
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the barn as a warrantless search of the curtilage of his home.478 While
the Court stated that the barn itself was curtilage of the defendant’s
home, it held the officers to be in open fields despite the officers standing under the barn’s overhang.479 The Court focused on the type of activities that occurred within the barn and the barn’s relationship to the
defendant’s home.480 Similarly, in Dow Chemical Co., the Court recognized that commercial buildings themselves can constitute protected
curtilage structures but not the outside, exposed areas within the manufacturing complex.481
The designation of curtilage areas is important because not only
the designation as curtilage affords some Fourth Amendment protection, but also this lack of a clear definition leaves law enforcement to
make an “on-the-spot” judgment themselves after having already entered the property. 482 Due to the increased level of information that can
be gathered, law enforcement observations of areas thought to be curtilage present a higher level of intrusion with drones than if officers mistakenly made warrantless visual observations of the area. 483 Warrantless drone surveillance of open fields areas will be permitted under the
Fourth Amendment but law enforcement runs the risk of committing
serious privacy right infringements when a misjudgment between curtilage and open fields occur.
2. I Spy with My Robot Eye: Aerial Drone Surveillance
The Supreme Court has generally upheld challenges under the
Fourth Amendment to governmental aerial surveillance.484 There are
several common principles in these cases that will be important to an
analysis of governmental drone surveillance.

478. Id. at 298.
479. Id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan emphasized the closeness
to the barn with which the officers had stood to make their observations, the protective
measures defendant took to obscure observation of the barn and its contents, and the
overall intrusiveness of the officers upon defendant’s property. Id. The dissent specifically
emphasized that officers had climbed over a wooden fence enclosing the barn and then
walked under the barn’s overhang, standing immediately close to the protective fish netting and shined their flashlight inside the barn. Id.
480. Id. at 301. The Court stated that the typical activities being held in the barn
were functional farming activities as opposed to intimate activities, the barn was sixty
(60) yards from the defendant’s home, and separate fences enclosing the barn from the
home exhibited a separation between the barn and the residence. Id.
481. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986).
482. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
483. For example, the Qube can operate for forty minutes, has a range of one kilometer, infrared technology, and can transmit real-time video back to the operator. Qube
Overview, supra note 64.
484. See generally Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); see also California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986); see also Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 227.
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First, the Court has emphasized the importance of the aerial surveillance taking place within legal, navigable airspace.485 The Court has
consistently held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy from observation of outdoor activities against members of the
general public or law enforcement from legal, navigable airspace.486 In
Riley, the Court denied the defendant’s challenge to police helicopter
surveillance of his greenhouse because helicopters are not subject to the
lower limits of navigable airspace that apply to other aircraft. In this
instance, at an altitude of 400 feet, the officer was within legal airspace.487 The Court has extended this principle to activities occurring
within the curtilage of the home when such activities are exposed to
navigable airspace.488
If the Court continues to link compliance with FAA regulations to
permissible governmental aerial surveillance, the use of drones for aerial surveillance will likewise be permissible. The FAA Modernization
and Reform Act of 2012 mandates the permissible operation of unmanned aircraft by law enforcement that weigh less than 4.4 pounds. 489
As Justice O’Connor argued in her dissent to Riley, reliance on FAA
guidelines in determining whether Fourth Amendment privacy interests have been violated is misplaced.490 The stated mission of the FAA
is to ensure safety in national airspace but is silent on protecting the
privacy of individuals.491 FAA guidelines are designed to determine
which types of aircraft can fly at a certain altitude for purposes of safe
aircraft operation, aircraft noise reduction, and other similar aerial
concerns.492 Determination of future FAA guidelines concerning drones
will be based on the best way to integrate drones safely into the National Airspace System.493 These FAA considerations have nothing to do
with the privacy concerns of individuals under the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court draws the correlation between FAA guidelines
and reasonable expectations of privacy through the third party doctrine

485. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213; Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
486. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212.
487. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
488. Id.
489. FAA Makes Progress with UAS Integration, supra note 84. The Act mandates
authorization of “government public safety” operation of an unmanned aircraft that
weighs under 4.4 pounds and meets the following restrictions: the aircraft must be flown
within the sightline of the operator, the aircraft can only be flown less than 400 feet from
the ground, the aircraft can only be flown during daylight, and the flight must take place
more than five miles from an airport. Id.
490. Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
491. Mission, supra note 69.
492. Safety: The Foundation of Everything We Do, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.faa.gov/about/safety_efficiency/.
493. Fact Sheet – Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Federal Aviation Administration
(Feb. 9, 2013), http://ww w.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153.
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concept by denying Fourth Amendment protection to what individuals
willingly expose to third parties..494 The Court held in both Ciraolo and
Riley that since the law enforcement surveillance occurred from altitudes that private, commercial, or government aircraft legally fly within, an individual can have no reasonable expectation of privacy to activities exposed to these aircrafts.495 The widespread commercial and
governmental use of fixed-wing planes and helicopters is such that the
defendants should have been put on notice that their activities would
be subject to observation.496 As FAA guidelines regarding domestic
drone use take effect and drone use becomes widespread, individuals
will be put on notice that activities occurring outside the home will be
fair game to observation by both private and public drones.
Second, the Court has refused to make a distinction between the
different types of aircraft employed for the surveillance.497 In Riley, officers employed the use of a helicopter, while in Ciraolo officers used a
fixed-wing airplane.498 Under FAA regulations, a plane may not fly under 500 feet while a helicopter may, giving a helicopter the ability for
closer observations.499 However, the Court rejected any distinction between the two aircraft as long as each was within permitted navigable
airspace.500
While the refusal to make Fourth Amendment analysis based on
the type of aircraft leads to a uniform application, it fails to take into
account the differences in the aircrafts’ technology and ability. With
GPS abilities, video and audio recorders, and sophisticated cameras,
drone technology exceeds that of the aircraft in Riley and Ciraolo.501 A
blanket rule governing drone surveillance equally with helicopter and
plane surveillance will not adequately protect Fourth Amendment
rights. Smaller drones are able to maneuver around corners and generally get closer to individuals than larger aircraft like planes and helicopters. Additionally, both helicopters and planes are loud which prohibits them from getting close without individuals being alerted to their
presence. While a setback of many drones is their noise level,502 developing technology promises an extremely low level of noise.503 Addition-

494. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989).
495. Id. at 450; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986).
496. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450-51.
497. Id. at 450.
498. Id. at 451.
499. Id. at 450.
500. Id.
501. Draganfly’s DraganFlyer X4 possesses thermal infrared cameras and an
onboard DVR. DraganFlyer X4 Features, supra note 51.
502. Several law enforcement agencies have stated that the noise level of drones will
generally prohibit surreptitious drone surveillance. Rayfield, supra note 102.
503. Robert Beckhusen, Super-Silent Owl Drone Will Spy on You Without You Ever
Noticing, WIRED (July 19, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/07/owl/.
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ally, some smaller drones have a “hover and stare” capability that allows for long-term, persistent surveillance of a single area with much
less chance of being noticed than a helicopter hovering above.504 These
technological advances make drone use far more invasive and efficient
than other aircraft and drones should not be analyzed under the same
standard.
Third, the Court emphasized that the observations made in these
cases were naked-eye observations by the officers.505 The Court reinforced the principle that officers are not required to “shield their eyes”
when passing a home on public thoroughfares. 506 Challenges that the
observations were made of the defendants’ protected curtilage areas
were denied.507 Officers were making the same observations that any
member of the public could have made had they been in the same navigable airspace.508
The concept that officers should not “shield their eyes” while flying
in navigable airspace will permit warrantless governmental drone surveillance.509 Law enforcement will be essentially using drones as their
eyes, receiving the images that the drones capture as relayed back to
them via a computer screen.510 The officers are not making “naked-eye”
observations from navigable airspace of activities but rather are solely
using sense-augmenting technology to observe activities that are not
perceivable with human visual surveillance. 511 However, if the senseaugmenting device is readily available to the public, law enforcement is
still making observations that any member of the public is able to
make.512 With the integration of private drones into national airspace,
any member of the public with access to a drone then has the legal
right to fly a drone at the designated altitude. Law enforcement’s use of

504. For example, the Honeywell T-Hawk Micro Air Vehicle (MAV). Goodman, Jr.,
supra note 450.
505. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213-14 (1986).
506. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304 (1987).
507. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214.
508. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214.
509. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
510. The Parrot AR. drone links with an iPhone, iPod, and iPad to relay images and
video back to the operator. Parrot AR Drone 2.0, supra note 49.
511. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (the observations by the officers
were found to be readily discernible as marijuana to the naked eye).
512. Id. at 213 (stating that it was unlikely that “Justice Harlan considered an aircraft within the category of future “electronic” developments that could stealthily intrude
upon an individual’s privacy.” Further, the Court emphasized that commercial and private flights in the public airspace were routine enough for it to be unreasonable for an
expectation of privacy of defendant’s marijuana plants from the officer’s naked-eye observations at an altitude of 1,000 feet); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (emphasizing that the “sense-enhancing technology” used by the officers was not in “general
public use”).

2013] WARRANTLESS GOVERNMENT DRONE SURVEILLANCE

209

a drone to conduct warrantless aerial surveillance in navigable airspace
will be permissible, subject to certain restrictions.513
C. Scope, Sharing, and Augmentation: The Information Gathered By
Drones
The Supreme Court has analyzed a multitude of surveillance devices employed by law enforcement under the Fourth Amendment.514 A
key consideration in this analysis been the scope of information that
the device is capable of conveying about an individual to law enforcement.515 The scope of information is magnified when a senseaugmenting device such as a thermal imager or beeper is involved. A
drone augments the senses through sophisticated imaging,516 GPS
tracking517, audio and video recording518, and other technology.519
Further, a drone presents the ability for long-term surveillance, which
could render the scope of information collected unreasonable.520
Another common principle in the Court’s Fourth Amendment
analysis of differing surveillance devices is the application of the third
party doctrine. Under the Katz test, an individual must manifest a subjective expectation of privacy that society is objectively recognizes as
reasonable.521 The Court consistently holds that an individual loses any

513. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (stating that in regards to an individual’s home, “all details
are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes”).
In accordance with the Kyllo ruling, warrantless drone observation of an individual’s
home will not be permitted. Id. at 31 (stating that “with few exceptions,” warrantless
search of an individual’s is unreasonable).
514. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (warrantless wiretapping of defendant’s phone); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (warrantless use of a spike mike); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (warrantless use of a
pen register); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27 (warrantless use of thermal imaging device); United
States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) (warrantless use of GPS device).
515. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (dog sniff limited to presence of contraband); Smith, 442 U.S. at 735 (scope of pen register limited to telephone numbers).
516. DraganFlyer X4 Features, supra note 51.
517. DraganFlyer
X8
Features;
GPS,
DRAGANFLY INNOVATIONS, INC.,
http://www.draganfly.com/uavhelicopter/draganflyerx8/features/gps.php?zoom_highlight=
GPS (last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
518. Parrot
AR
Drone
2.0,
Director
Mode,
PARROT,
http://ardrone2.parrot.com/apps/director-mode/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2013); DraganFlyer
X4
Features;
Wireless
Video
System,
DRAGANFLY
INNOVATIONS,
INC.,
http://www.draganfly.com/uav-helicopter/draganflyerx4/features/wirelessvideosystem.php
(last visited Dec. 21, 2013).
519. Draganfly’s “DraganFlyer X4” possesses thermal infrared cameras and an
onboard DVR. DraganFlyer X4 Features, supra note 51.
520. A Predator B drone can operate for up to thirty hours. Predator B UAS, supra
note 12.
521. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

210

J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW

[Vol. XXX

reasonable expectation of privacy to what he exposes to third parties. 522
Objectively, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in public activities or information.523 With an increase in the sharing of information and personal activities, the perception of what society deems as
reasonable may change. However, despite activities being exposed to
drones flying around navigable airspace, it still might not be society’s
expectation for those activities to be subject to warrantless government
observation.
1. Staying within the Lines: The Scope of Sense Augmentation Devices
A reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment can become an
unreasonable search due to an impermissible intensity or an overly
broad and intrusive scope.524 To be permissible under the Fourth
Amendment, the scope of the search must be narrowly targeted and
justifiable to the specific circumstance, which made the initiation of the
search reasonable.525 Closely related to the scope of information is the
augmentation level of the device or investigative tool that gives officers
access to information not ascertainable by the human senses. For example, the use of a narcotics dog augments an officer’s visual observation capabilities and can lead to the discovery of contraband items in
sealed containers or vehicles.526 The Supreme Court has yet to face a
device like a drone that has the capability to augment multiple senses,
and this sophistication gives the drone a broad scope of information
that it can collect.
In Smith, the Court held that the warrantless use of a pen register527 did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment due to
the device’s limited scope of only obtaining the phone numbers that an
individual dials.528 A pen register is unable to listen in on or record
communications; therefore, it cannot give information on the contents
of an individual’s private communications.529 Similarly, the Court upheld the warrantless use of a narcotics dog to sniff an individual’s luggage and vehicle.530 The dog sniff is limited in that the only items that
the dog sniff will reveal are contraband items that an individual has no

522. Id. at 351; Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 212 (1986).
523. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
524. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
525. Id.
526. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
527. Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 (a pen register is a device that records on paper all the
phone numbers dialed on a specific phone).
528. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979).
529. Id. at 741.
530. Place, 462 U.S. at 707; see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).
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legitimate interest in possessing.531 The warrantless search of an individual’s garbage was held to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment due largely to the search being limited to objects that the defendant voluntarily exposed to the public.532
Conversely, the Court has found Fourth Amendment violations in
situations with a limited scope of information gathered but that exhibit
an overly intense and intrusive investigative manner. 533 In Bond, the
Court found an impermissible tactile observation when the officer physically squeezed the defendant’s luggage in an effort to locate drugs. 534
The officer did not open the individual’s luggage but was limited to the
tactile observation of the outside of the bag. 535 However, the warrantless tactile observation of the defendant’s luggage violated the Fourth
Amendment due to the broad scope of the search giving the agent accessibility to the defendant’s personal property. 536 Unlike a narcotics
dog sniff, the officer’s tactile examination is not limited to contraband
items and the officer is examining an individual’s personal items in his
luggage.537 While a passenger traveling on a bus can expect a certain
amount of bumping or moving of his luggage by other passengers or bus
employees, the officer’s “probing tactile examination” of the defendant’s
bag was found to overly intrusive.538
However, even though a device or technique has a limited scope,
this does not mean that protected information will not be revealed. Justice Brennan dissented in Greenwood and argued that the scope of a
garbage search is not limited to items knowingly exposed to the public.539 Even though an individual is willingly parting with the items in
his garbage, he does not necessarily wish or expect that the private information contained in the garbage will become public.540 Justice Brennan argued that one’s garbage can reveal private details about an individual’s life such as financial, health, political, and recreational
information that the Fourth Amendment protects from warrantless intrusion.541 Similarly, Justice Souter’s dissent in Caballes discounted the
limited scope of a narcotics dog sniff.542 Narcotic dogs are not “infallible”

531. Place, 462 U.S. at 707; see also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
532. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
533. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 334 (2000) (impermissible physical manipulation of luggage); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 708, 715 (1984) (impermissible monitoring of beeper when beeper located in defendant’s home).
534. Bond, 529 U.S. at 334.
535. Id.
536. Id. at 337-38.
537. Id. at 338-39.
538. Id.
539. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 46 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
540. Id.
541. Id. at 50-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
542. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 412 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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and a dog sniff might reveal intimate details about an individual instead of contraband items.543 In Jones, Justice Sotomayor emphasized
that a location-tracking device such as a GPS can reveal intimate information about an individual.544 While a GPS can be limited to gathering information about an individual’s movements along public roads
these movements can lead to the discovery of intimate activities such as
political associations and religious beliefs.545
Similar to GPS monitoring, using a drone for mass surveillance
will reveal intimate information about an individual. While beepers are
limited to providing law enforcement with locations based on radio
transmissions,546 drones employ GPS tracking technology and can provide law enforcement with precise, accurate suspect locations coupled
with real-time video.547 For example, if a large drone is positioned
above a city to monitor civilian activities along public areas, this monitoring will also reveal trips to church, health clinic, doctor, and other
similar sensitive information. As Justice Sotomayor noted in Jones,
knowledge of such activities being monitored can have a chilling effect
on public expression and associations.548 Using a drone for wide-scale
surveillance of large public areas creates an overly broad scope that violates the Fourth Amendment. Much like the tactile examination in
Bond was unable to limit the scope to only touching contraband items,
there is no feasible way for a drone to only monitor illegal activities in
large urban areas.
When using a drone for short-term monitoring or information
gathering purposes, it will be hard for law enforcement to adhere to a
limited scope. For example, if an officer is using a drone for warrantless
aerial surveillance over an individual’s backyard or even empty fields
the drone search must be limited to these unprotected areas. If the
drone is over an individual’s backyard and takes thermal images of the
inside of an individual’s home or picks up an individual’s conversation
not only is this evidence inadmissible but the individual’s privacy rights
under the Fourth Amendment have been violated.549 The question that
needs to be determined is whether or not the information a drone can
gather is able to be adequately limited.

543. Id.
544. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
545. Id.
546. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 708, 715-18 (1984).
547. For example, the Qube can transmit a live video of the images it observes with a
high-resolution color camera and a thermal camera. Qube Overview, supra note 64,
548. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
549. Evidence collected with an invalid warrant or by an unreasonable search is generally excluded. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
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When reviewing the use of sense augmentation tools, the Court
has held that such tools cannot be used to obtain information that is not
discoverable through naked-eye surveillance.550 Law enforcement’s visual observation capabilities are being augmented by use of the device to
give officers information regarding the inside of an individual’s home or
other protected structure. This is an unreasonably broad scope of information. Thus in Kyllo, the Court held that the use of a thermal imaging device to obtain information regarding the inner activities of the defendant’s home violated the Fourth Amendment.551 The officers would
have had to enter the defendant’s home to obtain such information
without the thermal imaging device.552 Since warrantless searches of an
individual’s home are unconstitutional, the officers could not have obtained the information that defendant was growing marijuana in his
home without the use of the thermal imaging device.553
Conversely, in Knotts the Court upheld the warrantless monitoring
of the defendant on public roads through the use of a beeper placed inside a container.554 The Court held that the use of the beeper revealed
no information that the officers could not have obtained had they relied
solely on visual observation of the defendant driving on public roadways.555 Distinguishing Knotts, the Court in Karo held that warrantless
monitoring of a beeper that revealed information pertaining to activities occurring inside the home violates the Fourth Amendment. 556 Officers used both visual and beeper surveillance to trace the defendant’s
movements along public roadways to the defendant’s residence. 557 However, when the defendant left the residence the officers continued to
monitor the beeper signals to confirm that the container was still inside
the house and not in the defendant’s vehicle.558 This information was
not subject to visual observation and would have required the officers to
enter the residence.559
Warrantless drone surveillance to track a suspect is comparable to
the warrantless uses of a beeper and GPS. However, a key distinction
between beeper surveillance and GPS or drone surveillance is the ability to maintain long-term, persistent surveillance that exceeds the capabilities of law enforcement using solely visual surveillance.560 In
550. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001); Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
551. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
555. Id. at 281-82.
556. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 708, 715-18 (1984).
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Predator B UAS, supra note 12. A Predator B drone can operate for up to thirty
hours. Id. Justice Alito noted that previously due to costs and difficulty, law enforcement
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Knotts, the officers had lost sight of the defendant’s vehicle while following him and had to rely solely on the beeper signal to follow the defendant to his cabin.561 The Court stated that had the officers not lost
visual contact with the defendant’s vehicle, he was still traveling on
public roadways and therefore his movements were obtainable through
visual observation.562 Despite the officers not being physically able to
visually observe the defendant’s movements along the street, since they
would have been able to see him, the Knotts Court upheld the beeper
information.563 Although the Court in Jones found the warrantless installation and monitoring of a GPS device to violate the Fourth
Amendment, the Court based that decision on a finding of a physical
trespass.564 The Court did not address situations of warrantless, longterm monitoring of an individual’s movements along public roads by a
device that does not physically interfere with the individual. Under
Knotts, the warrantless use of drones to monitor an individual along
public roadways does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even if
drones permit law enforcement to monitor an individual for days,
weeks, or months, if the individual’s movements are exposed to visual
observation then the government can observe them.
The common principle among these cases is that law enforcement
needs to obtain a warrant to use sense-augmenting devices to gather
information that is not observable through visual surveillance or is of
the home.565 In both Karo and Kyllo, the information obtained by officers was not overly intimate or detailed information but since the information would have required a warrantless entry into the defendants’
homes, it violated the Fourth Amendment. 566 Under this principle, the
sheriff in North Dakota using a drone with infrared camera capabilities
to fly over the ranchers’ home violates the holding in Kyllo. It is a presumptively unreasonable search for law enforcement to use a senseenhancing device to obtain information not available without physical
entry into the home.567 The sheriff could not have determined where in
the house the members of the family were, what they were doing, and
whether or not they were armed without entry into the home.
2. Careful What You Share: The Third Party Doctrine and Knowing

could not practically observe and collect the amount of information that new devices such
as a GPS now permit. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
561. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282-83 (1983).
562. Id. at 284-85.
563. Id.
564. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
565. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
566. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715-18; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
567. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
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Exposure under the Katz Test
The Supreme Court has consistently held that what an individual
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home, is not subject to
Fourth Amendment protection.568 Protection under the Katz test requires a subjective and objective expectation of privacy.569 There can be
no expectation of privacy in information or activities exposed to third
parties.570 With the thought of drones flying around in national airspace looming, the inquiry is whether there are any adequate protective
measures that will manifest a legitimate expectation of privacy in outdoor activities.
In Smith, the Supreme Court expressly stated that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to
third parties.571 Officers used a pen register572 to obtain the phone
numbers that the defendant dialed from his home phone.573 The Court
held that an individual has no reasonable expectation in phone numbers he dials because that information is knowingly and willingly conveyed to the phone company.574 In Greenwood, the Court upheld the
warrantless search and seizure of the defendant’s garbage put on the
street curb.575 Similarly, the Court held that individuals do not enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage that they knowingly and
willingly expose to a third party, the garbage collector.576
In these cases, the Court held that the defendants knowingly exposed information and affects to third parties when there were no other
methods the defendants could have used. Unless individuals do not
want to use a telephone, the telephone numbers dialed will be
automatically relayed to the phone company. In Greenwood, not only
did the defendant have to take his garbage out for hygiene purposes, he
was required by a city ordinance to put his garbage on the curb. 577 Additionally, an individual might expect exposure of a phone number to
the phone company or garbage to the garbage collector but not necessarily to warrantless police investigation. However, the Court held in

568. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 39 (1988); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
569. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
570. Id. at 351; Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41.
571. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
572. Id. at 736, fn. 1 (a pen register is a device that records on paper all the phone
numbers dialed on a specific phone).
573. Id. at 737.
574. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
575. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 38, 37 (1988).
576. Id. at 41.
577. Id. at 55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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both instances that individuals must reasonably expect that this information will be exposed to police investigation.578
Another flaw in the third party doctrine as applied to Fourth
Amendment privacy challenges is the broad application to all information “knowingly exposed.” Even though an individual knowingly disposes of his garbage or travels along public streets, he does not expect
that all information surrounding these events will be exposed. Justice
Brennan noted in his Greenwood dissent that personal items revealing
intimate details of an individual’s life are disposed of along with garbage and society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in such
items.579 Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence in Jones noted that in
light of changing technology, the third party doctrine might not be applicable.580 Justice Sotomayor emphasized that while information is
willingly submitted during online business transactions, individuals are
not necessarily knowingly exposing this information to all online third
parties that are acquiring their information.581
Measures taken to manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy in
outdoor activities have been consistently dismissed in aerial surveillance and open fields cases.582 In Dow Chem. Co., Ciraolo, and Riley,
adequate measures had been taken to obscure ground-level observations but the Court dismissed any correlation to aerial observations. 583
Ciraolo and Riley even involved aerial surveillance of the defendants’
backyards, areas protected under the Fourth Amendment.584 In Riley,
the defendant contained his activities inside a greenhouse with opaque
panels, surrounded by shrubs and his mobile home.585 However, the
Court dismissed these efforts to block observations into the greenhouse
because there were several missing panels that allowed observations
from navigable airspace.586
In his dissent in Ciraolo, Justice Powell stated that “few build
roofs over their backyards,”587 and in Riley, Justice O’Connor emphasized the impossibility to block every possible view of a backyard. 588
With the integration of drones into navigable airspace, individuals will

578. Id. at 39; Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43.
579. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
580. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
581. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
582. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 182 (1984); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302; Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 240-41(1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
583. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212; Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 236; Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 450 (1989).
584. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212.
585. Riley, 488 U.S. at 447.
586. Id. at 450.
587. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting).
588. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450-54 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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likewise be knowingly exposing outdoor activities to flying drones. It is
uncertain whether there are any measures that the Supreme Court
would determine to be adequate to manifest a legitimate privacy interest against warrantless government drone aerial surveillance.
PART IV: ADEQUATE MEASURES TO PROTECT PRIVACY INTERESTS AGAINST
DRONE SURVEILLANCE
After examining the extensive precedent of Fourth Amendment
challenges to governmental surveillance, there are several types of
drone uses that will be permitted. First, warrantless drone use to obtain information about activities inside the home violates the Fourth
Amendment. The use of a sense-augmenting device to obtain information about the intimate activities of the home is presumptively unreasonable.589 A drone is augmenting the senses by providing long-term
surveillance with video, detailed images, and tracking technology that
exceeds human capabilities.590 The home is the locus of our most intimate activities and the Fourth Amendment adequately protects this
privacy.591 Any use of drones to discern a suspect’s activities within the
house will require a warrant.
Second, warrantless drone surveillance of commercial buildings or
business offices will violate the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment protects business offices and commercial buildings but
that protection is less than the home.592 With infrared technology,
drones will be able to decipher activities occurring within commercial
buildings. Just like infrared surveillance of the inside of a private
home, infrared images of a commercial building will equally violate the
Fourth Amendment.593
Third, using drones in exigent circumstances or to survey uninhabited areas does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless
searches where law enforcement cannot reasonably obtain a warrant

589. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
590. Draganfly’s DraganFlyer X4 possesses thermal infrared cameras and an
onboard DVR. Government Applications, supra note 23. The Qube can operate for forty
minutes, has a range of one kilometer, infrared technology, and can transmit real-time
video back to the operator. Qube Overview, supra note 64.
591. The highest level of protection under the Fourth Amendment is in the home. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
592. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978).
593. The Court in Dow Chemical Co. noted that had the photographs of Dow’s complex been taken with a device that could penetrate walls or listen to conversations, the
aerial surveillance might require a warrant. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227, 238-39 (1986).
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but swift action is required.594 Using a drone in a hostage situation or to
detect potentially armed suspects is likely to fall under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment. In the North Dakota
situation, the sheriff had actual knowledge of the suspects being armed
and used the drone to detect where on the property they were located.595 However, this use might not fall under an exigent circumstance
because the Sheriff engaged in prolonged monitoring of the defendants,
rather than using the drone at the scene.596 Additionally, warrantless
drone use in missing person cases such as the McStay family case will
be permitted so long as the areas are uninhabited.597
There are several areas of prior Fourth Amendment analysis that
leave warrantless government drone use uncertain. In order to properly
protect privacy interests and permit law enforcement the use of an important tool, several changes must be made in the current Fourth
Amendment analysis.
A. Governmental Drone Use Requires Changing the Aerial
Surveillance Standard
The current standard permitting warrantless governmental aerial
surveillance from FAA-mandated navigable airspace should not be applicable to governmental drone surveillance. 598 Under the current
standard, what a person knowingly exposes to aircraft legally in FAA
approved airspace is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.599
In Florida v. Riley, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence proposed an inquiry
focused on whether the aircraft is traveling at an altitude that the general public regularly travels and not whether the aircraft is at an FAA
permitted altitude.600 Thus, if the general public regularly flies at a certain altitude then an individual can have no reasonable expectation of
privacy to activities that are discernible from such an altitude.601

594. An example would to prevent the destruction of evidence or serious harm. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011).
595. Dillow, supra note 10.
596. Bennett, supra note 11.
597. The drone in the McStay missing persons case was used to search forty miles of
an isolated highway. Friedman, supra note 6. Presumably, an isolated area would be considered “open fields” which receives no protection under the 4th Amendment. See Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
598. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (holding there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy against police observations from a plane in legal navigable airspace); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy against police observations from a helicopter in legal navigable airspace).
599. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212-13.
600. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
601. Id.
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The analysis of whether warrantless governmental aerial drone
surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment should be focused on the
inquiry proposed by Justice O’Connor in her Riley concurrence.602 An
aircraft-based standard better reflects the privacy expectations of society rather than abiding by FAA regulations. The Katz test asks whether
an individual manifests a reasonable expectation of privacy that society
is prepared to recognize as legitimate.603 The mission of the FAA is to
ensure safety in national airspace and not to protect the privacy of individuals.604
Different aircraft have different technological abilities and using a
standard that recognizes a distinction between types of aircraft will
best protect privacy against drone use. For example, the law enforcement helicopter used in Riley was flying at an altitude of 400 feet
whereas the plane in Ciraolo was flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet. 605
The FAA regulations allow helicopters to fly at a lower altitude than an
airplane.606 Justice O’Connor argued that the public generally does not
fly a helicopter at an altitude of 400 feet and the general public does not
readily have access to such an expensive vehicle.607 Flying a plane at an
altitude of 1,000 feet or a helicopter at 400 feet permits limited visual
observation whereas flying a drone below 400 feet broadens the scope of
observation. Lower flying drones present a much greater intrusion into
an individual’s privacy; therefore, the inquiry into permissible warrantless law enforcement drone surveillance should be an analysis on a different basis rather than the current correlation with FAA regulations.
Even without an infrared camera or advanced optics, simply being able
to fly the drone at a lower altitude than either a plane or helicopter
gives law enforcement closer, clearer observations.
With the impending integration of drones into domestic airspace,
the general public and government agencies will have access to drones.
Future FAA regulations could permit small drones to fly at a much
lower altitude than both planes and helicopters.608 By following FAA
regulations, law enforcement will be making the same observations
that any member of the public with a drone can equally make. Permitting a Fourth Amendment analysis on the basis of whether the drone is
in permissible navigable airspace leaves society open to the possibility

602. Id.
603. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
604. Mission, supra note 69.
605. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
207 (1986).
606. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451 (stating that FAA regulations prohibit fixed-wing aircraft
below 500 feet whereas helicopters are permitted below that level).
607. Id. at 454.
608. For example, the Qube only has a maximum altitude of 500 feet. Qube Overview,
supra note 64.
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that all actions, conversations, and activities will be subject to a drone
hovering 200 feet above.
Shifting the Fourth Amendment analysis to an aircraft-based inquiry will also change the evaluation of the appropriate protective
measures society must take to manifest a legitimate expectation of privacy. Since the use of drones does not require a physical trespass, challenges to warrantless drone surveillance under the Fourth Amendment
will be made under the two-part Katz test.609 The Katz test requires
both a subjective and objective manifestation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.610 An analysis that focuses on the type of aircraft will
change the Court’s view of protective measures. As Justice O’Connor
observed in her Riley concurrence, it is unclear what protective
measures an individual can take to shield against aerial observations of
private activities.611 Society’s expectations of what is being exposed to
naked-eye observations from a helicopter flying at 400 feet may be different than what society expects will be exposed to a drone flying above
at 400 feet. However, using a standard based on FAA regulations evaluates society’s expectations as if both aircraft were the same.
Generally, individuals enjoy outdoor activities in their backyards,
but if they are required to take extreme protective measures against
low flying drone surveillance (such as erecting a roof-like structure),
these activities may become compromised. Surely, the Framers did not
intend individuals to be wary about celebrating the Fourth of July in
their backyards for fear of who could be watching. Focusing on the type
of aircraft being used will allow a proper consideration of what subjective and objective privacy concerns a drone presents rather than using
a comparable standard to helicopters and planes. Focusing on FAA regulations simply does not take into account the necessary privacy interests that warrantless drone surveillance threatens.
1. Sharing is Good? Updating the Third Party Doctrine
Under the Fourth Amendment, the third party doctrine strips protection from information exposed to third parties. 612 Similarly, there is
no Fourth Amendment protection to activities that are knowingly exposed to third parties or to the general public.613 However, this principle is inadequate to protect privacy needs when faced with advanced
technology.

609.
610.
611.
612.
613.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 347.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 454 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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The Supreme Court has applied the third party doctrine to the
warrantless use of beepers to monitor individuals’ movements along
public roads.614 When an individual is traveling along a public street,
his movement is exposed to observation by other drivers and the general public. However, the scope of information that a beeper can give is
limited to the defendant’s movements.615 In Karo, officers stepped outside the accepted scope by using the beeper to monitor movements inside the defendant’s residence.616 Information obtained about the defendant’s intimate, protected activities inside the home rendered the
search unreasonable.617 However, even when limited to information
gathered about public movements, persistent surveillance can reveal
intimate information.618
In Jones, the Court reviewed the warrantless use of a more advanced tracking device: the GPS.619 While the Court held that a GPS
installation requires a warrant under a physical trespass theory, the
Court did not resolve the question for devices that require no attachment to property.620 The majority in Jones did not comment on the fact
that the defendant was tracked by GPS for twenty-eight days or the
over 2,000 pages of data collected on the defendant’s movements. Some
of the 2,000 pages of data could have provided intimate details of the
defendant’s life that the defendant did not “knowingly expose.” While
society recognizes that observations will be made of movements along
public streets,621 a GPS device or a drone can accumulate large amounts
of information on long periods of these movements. 622 Similar to an examination of an individual’s garbage, 2,000 pages of an individual’s
movements along public streets can be far more revealing and comprehensive of one’s intimate activities than would be reasonably expected
to be conveyed by traveling along public streets. 623 As Justice Sotomayor stated in her concurrence, under the third party doctrine de-

614. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 708, 708 (1984).
615. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
616. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715-18.
617. Id.
618. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
619. Id.at 945.
620. Id. at 948.
621. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
622. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
623. Id. at 955-56 (citing concerns that through the discovery of an individual’s
movements, private details such as an individual’s religious beliefs, appointments with a
psychiatrist, political meetings or associations, and other such personal information may
be revealed).
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vices such as smartphones equipped with GPS could permit such persistent surveillance.624
The question then becomes what is modern society’s reasonable
expectation of the amount of information that is knowingly exposed to
the public. A broad principle denying protection to information or activities exposed to third parties does not take into consideration the data
gathering capabilities of modern technology. The Supreme Court will
have to change the third party doctrine focus to what type of information society reasonably believes is being exposed to third parties.
D. Regulating the Scope of Governmental Drones
A final option to ensure government drone use is limited is
through legislation. There are several uncertainties in Fourth Amendment protection over the warrantless governmental use of drones that
would be adequately addressed by legislation. There are multiple situations that permit the warrantless use of less invasive law enforcement
tools. Permitting the warrantless use of a drone in similar situations
would be dangerous when considering the broad scope of information
that a drone can collect.
For example, the “automobile exception” of the Fourth Amendment
permits the warrantless search of an individual’s vehicle when there is
probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband.625 Even with the
probable cause requirement, an infrared scan with a drone is far more
invasive than a tactile examination of a vehicle. The Supreme Court
has held that overly invasive devices or search techniques require a
warrant,626 but it is uncertain what level of intrusiveness would violate
the Fourth Amendment. Legislation that clearly defines whether or not
a warrant is needed for a drone search of a vehicle aids law enforcement and puts the public on notice of its rights.
Similarly, the open fields doctrine becomes distorted when applied
to drones. Protection against unwarranted governmental intrusions
into the home is extended to curtilage areas but there is no Fourth
Amendment protection to open fields.627 However, the analysis on the
designation between curtilage of the home and open fields has not been
consistent.628 The conflict between curtilage and open fields in using
drones is magnified because drones have expansive, detailed views of

624. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
625. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982).
626. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 334 (2000); Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 27 (2001).
627. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987); Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
628. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 175 (1984).
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areas. Additionally, by sending these images to cell phones, computers,
or even to its own DVR, the drone can retain these images for a significant period of time. 629 Officers using drones to determine whether or
not a suspect is growing marijuana in a literal open fields area does not
require a warrant. However, officers run the risk of infringing privacy
rights if the warrantless use of the drone results in obtaining information or images of an individual’s curtilage.
While it would be impracticable to develop a strict rule designating
protected areas, a broader legislative rule is necessary. For example, a
strict rule allowing drone use on any area more than 100 feet from a
house is inadequate because individual areas host different activities.
Whereas 100 feet from person A’s home is an empty field, the same area at person B’s property could host a swimming pool. However, a broad
rule prohibiting warrantless use of a drone on property that contains
any inhabited buildings would best protect the interests of both the
public and law enforcement.
Several federal and state legislative guidelines provide for the governmental use of drones. For example, Senator Paul introduced the
Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012.630 The
Act requires a warrant for all government drone use subject to three
exceptions: border patrol, exigent circumstances, and the risk of a terrorist attack.631 However, broadly prohibiting all warrantless use of
governmental drones is unnecessary and fails to adequately balance the
needs of privacy protection and law enforcement. Officers should be
able to use drones to determine if a suspect is growing marijuana in his
uninhabited fields. There are no privacy interests being violated in such
a situation involving open fields. As the Kyllo Court stated, law enforcement is not prohibited from using sense-augmenting devices as
long as no constitutionally protected interests are violated. 632 Additionally, a broad exception for border patrol use does not adequately protect
the privacy interests of individuals living along the Mexican or Canadian borders.633
Legislative control over governmental drone use is important in
regulating the scope of information a drone can collect and the retention of that information. Regulations that forbid infrared surveillance
in an urban area or surveillance on a wide-scale basis need to be con-

629. Parrot AR Drone 2.0, supra note 49.
630. Sen. Paul Introduces Bill, supra note 100.
631. Id.; Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012, S. 3287,
112th Cong. (2012) (stating that the Act was introduced to Congress on June 12, 2012 but
was not enacted).
632. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
633. Seventy to seventy-five percent of Canadians live within five miles of the U.S.
border and millions of Mexicans live within ten miles of the U.S. border. Posner on the
Privacy Implications, supra note 94.
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sidered. Even if the surveillance technology is limited, widespread surveillance of an individual’s movements can reveal intimate activities
that the Fourth Amendment protects.
CONCLUSION
On October 12, 1999, ten-year-old Pamela Butler was rollerblading
back from buying cookies at the local gas station.634 Within sight of her
three sisters, a white pick-up truck pulled up next to Pamela and a man
dragged her into the truck.635 Pamela’s sisters started screaming to
other nearby residents as the truck sped away with Pamela inside.636 A
neighbor jumped in his car and followed the truck. 637 However, the kidnapper eluded the neighbor and disappeared with Pamela. 638 On October 14, the kidnapper was captured by police and revealed that he had
killed Pamela.639 Pamela Butler’s disheartening story is an example of
the type of situation where government drone use can make a great impact. If the neighbor giving chase was able to give police the kidnapper’s license plate, vehicle description, and direction of travel with a cell
phone, this vital information could have been relayed to a drone.640 Easily deployable, armed with license plate recognition, infrared, real-time
video, and prolonged mobility, a drone adds a powerful aid to law enforcement to future cases like Pamela Butler’s.641
However, in recognizing that drones provide benefits to law enforcement, there must also be recognition of the privacy concerns they
present. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals in their property
and person through the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.642 When faced with warrantless use by law enforcement of
electronic surveillance devices, the Supreme Court asks whether an individual exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy that society is objectively prepared to recognize as reasonable.643
An examination of Fourth Amendment analysis of these various
government surveillance devices reveals a general principle; as technology advances, society’s expectation of privacy inevitably diminishes.
When Orville Wright successfully completed a twelve-second flight in
634. Tony Morton, Girls in the ‘Hood, THE PITCH (Nov. 30, 2000),
http://www.pitch.com/kansascity/girls-in-the-hood/Content?oid=2162050.
635. Id.
636. Id.
637. Id.
638. United States v. Nelson, 347 F.3d 701, 705 (2003).
639. Id.
640. Id.
641. Geiger, supra note 38.
642. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (holding that the Constitution
does not forbid all searches and seizures, only those that are unreasonable).
643. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967).
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1903, a new form of transportation was introduced to the world.644 This
new mode of transportation emerged as a commercial travel, military,
and law enforcement tool.645 With the successful dissemination of the
telephone came the ability of law enforcement to listen in on an individual’s phone conversations through wiretapping and a broad array of
listening devices. The widespread use of law enforcement helicopters
and airplanes as a means of public travel has lowered society’s privacy
expectations in outdoor activities. Advancing vehicular tracking technology has eroded any expectation of privacy in an individual’s vehicular movements along public roads. Soon, law enforcement will have a
new surveillance device to utilize: the drone.
With new devices emerging that expand the amount of information
being shared to the public, the key in determining warrantless governmental drone surveillance will be what society has come to consider
reasonable in the modern age.646 In order to make this determination,
the Supreme Court needs to alter the aerial surveillance standard and
focus on what type of aerial surveillance vehicle is being used instead of
relying on FAA regulations. Further, when applying the two-part Katz
test to governmental drone surveillance, the Court must take into account the changing perception of society and the amount of data that is
inadvertently exposed to third parties as a part of routine life in a digital age. Surveillance that would have been unacceptable before may
well be considered reasonable today and absent any legislation, it will
be for the Supreme Court to determine whether society considers warrantless government drone use to be reasonable.

644. Wilbur and Orville Wright built the plane that Orville operated to complete the
“first sustained, powered flight” on December 17, 1903. The first usable airplane was subsequently built in 1905. A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 69.
645. Id.
646. For example, the Looxcie hands-free streaming social camera lets an individual
stream any activity they want live and post it to a social media site. LOOXCIE,
http://looxcie.com/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
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